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We consider a monopolistic supplier’s optimal choice of wholesale tariffs when
downstream firms are privately informed about their retail costs. Under discrim-
inatory pricing, downstream firms that differ in their ex ante distribution of retail
costs are offered different tariffs. Under uniform pricing, the same wholesale tariff
is offered to all downstream firms. In contrast to the extant literature on third-
degree price discrimination with nonlinear wholesale tariffs, we find that banning
discriminatory wholesale contracts—the usual legal practice in the EU and US—
often is beneficial for social welfare. This result is shown to be robust even when
the upstream supplier faces competition in the form of fringe supply.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Third-degree price discrimination is a widely used business practice in intermediate-good mar-
kets, i.e., manufactures often apply different conditions to identical transactions with different
retailers. The pros and cons of this pricing practice have been discussed among legal and eco-
nomic scholars since the 30’s and are still debatable. Whether third-degree price discrimination
by a large manufacturer represents an abuse of its dominant position is a crucial question in
many antitrust decisions on both sides of the Atlantic ocean.1 For a long time, the economic
literature on third-degree price discrimination has presumed that it is optimal for the manufac-
turer to offer linear wholesale contracts. As documented by recent empirical evidence, however,
another common pricing practice employed by manufacturers are quantity rebate schemes2 —
which is hardly surprising in the face of the well-known double marginalization problem. In the
∗We have benefited from comments made by conference audiences at EARIE (Stockholm), the SFB Meeting
(Tutzing), and the ANR-DFG Workshop on Market Power in Vertically Related Markets (Paris) as well as
seminar audiences at the University of Toulouse, and by Frago Kourandi, Matthias Kräkel, Takeshi Murooka,
Claudia Salim, Klaus M. Schmidt and Patrick Schmitz. All errors are of course our own.
†University of Munich, Department of Economics, Ludwigstr. 28, D-80539 Munich, Germany, E-mail address:
fabian.herweg@lrz.uni-muenchen.de
‡University of Bonn, Department of Economics, Adenauerallee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn, Germany, E-mail address:
daniel.mueller@uni-bonn.de, Tel: +49-228-733918, Fax: +49-228-739210 (corresponding author).
1For an overview of landmark antitrust cases in the EU see Russo et al. (2010).
2Analyzing data obtained from the American yogurt market and the French market for bottled mineral water, re-
spectively, Villas-Boas (2007) and Bonnet and Dubois (2010) find that vertical contracts between manufacturers
and retailers are often nonlinear.
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light of such evidence, there has been renewed interest in exploring the implications of banning
third-degree price discrimination in input markets when wholesale contracts allow for quantity
discounts. By and large, the emerging literature on third-degree price discrimination in input
markets under nonlinear wholesale contracts agrees upon a ban on price discrimination being
detrimental for social welfare—see O’Brien and Shaffer (1994), Rey and Tirole (2007), Inderst
and Shaffer (2009), and Arya and Mittendorf (2010).
This clearcut theoretical prediction is at odds with the legal practice in the EU as well as in
the US, where antitrust authorities regard quantity discounts as a justifiable pricing strategy of
manufacturers as long as they are non-discriminatory. This point of view of antitrust authorities,
e.g. the European Commission, becomes apparent, in a series of decisions. For instance, in the
Michelin I judgment from 1981; the Commission did not contest the quantity rebate scheme
itself, but its alleged discriminatory nature with “comparable amounts purchased almost never
result[ing] in the same or comparable discount being granted.” (Recital 42 of Commission
decision 81/969/EEC) Likewise, in the European sugar industry decision from 1973, the Com-
mission ruled that “the granting of a rebate which does not depend on the amount bought [...]
is an unjustifiable discrimination [...].” (Recital II-E-1 of Commission decision 73/109/EC)3 In
contrast to the extant theoretical literature, but in line with the usual legal practice, we derive
conditions such that banning discriminatory nonlinear wholesale contracts is socially desirable.
The novelty of our paper is to allow for privately informed downstream firms, a possibility
which so far has been ignored in the literature.
We investigate the welfare effects of banning discriminatory nonlinear wholesale tariffs in a
model with two downstream firms that have private information regarding their own retail cost,
which is either high or low. Ex ante, downstream firms differ in the distribution of their retail
cost and this is known by a monopolistic upstream manufacturer. If third-degree price discrim-
ination is permitted, the manufacturer offers to downstream firms with different distributions
of retail costs a different menu of transfer-quantity pairs. Under uniform pricing, on the other
hand, the same menu is offered to both downstream firms. When deciding whether to accept
the manufacturer’s offer, each downstream firm is privately informed about the realization of
its retail cost. Thus, the manufacturer does not only offer nonlinear tariffs to reduce double
marginalization but also to screen downstream firms according to retail efficiency.4
In our baseline model, the two downstream firms serve independent markets which allows us
to disentangle the effect of banning discriminatory wholesale tariffs from potential competitive
effects. Moreover, with the European Commission taking a strict stand against geographic price
discrimination across countries, the case of separate markets seems a natural starting point for
our analysis.5 Here, the quantities produced by low-cost retailers are independent of the pricing
3Other decisions include the Eurofix—Bauco/Hilti case, where the commission objected that the reduction of dis-
counts was not linked primarily to any objective criteria such as quantity. (Commission decision 88/138/EEC)
Even in the Michelin II judgment from 2003, which sometimes is seen as a per se rule against rebates (Wael-
broeck, 2005), the Commission stated that “the Court of Justice has ruled against the granting of quantity rebates
by an undertaking in a dominant position where the rebates exceed a reasonable period of three months [...] on
the grounds that such a practice is not in line with normal competition based on price.” (Recital 216 of Com-
mission decision 2002/405/EC) Thus, it was not the quantity rebate per se, but rather the reference period of one
year that was contested by the Commission.
4A model of vertical relations where downstream firms’ costs are stochastic is analyzed by Rey and Tirole (1986).
They do not discuss third-degree price discrimination.
5For geographic price discrimination to be feasible, parallel imports—i.e., arbitraging across countries—have to
be absent. As stated in the 29th Report on Competition Policy, “the Commission has used its competition policy
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regime because under both regimes there is no-distortion-at-the-top. The quantities procured
by high-cost retailers, on the other hand, depend on the pricing regime. Under price discrim-
ination, the high-cost type of the ex ante more efficient firm—more likely to be a low cost
producer—procures a lower quantity than the high-cost type of the ex ante less efficient firm.
The quantity procured by ex post high-cost retailers under uniform pricing is bracketed by the
quantities assigned to high-cost retailers under price discrimination. Banning price discrimina-
tion therefore—in expectations—harms the market which is served by the ex ante more efficient
firm, whereas the other market, which is served by the ex ante less efficient firm, benefits. Due
to these opposing effects, general welfare results are hard to obtain. Nevertheless, we show that
uniform pricing is optimal from a welfare point of view as long as price discrimination does not
lead to an expansion of (expected) total output. For the case of linear demand and provided that
all markets are being served under either pricing regime, price discrimination does not lead to
an expansion of total output and thus is detrimental for welfare.
The manufacturer, however, might consider it optimal not to serve a high-cost retailer. On the
one hand, if the ex ante more efficient firm is very unlikely to produce at high cost but the aver-
age probability of high-cost production nevertheless is quite high, then the high-cost type of the
ex ante more efficient firm is served under uniform pricing but not under price discrimination—
i.e., uniform pricing leads to more markets being served in expectations. In this case, with price
discrimination benefiting one market (due to a lower quantity distortion) but harming the other
market (which may not be served), again a ban on price discrimination improves welfare if price
discrimination does not lead to an expansion of (expected) total output. On the other hand, if
the average probability of high-cost production is low but the ex ante less efficient firm is nev-
ertheless quite likely to produce at high cost, then only under price discrimination—and only in
the ex ante less efficient market—high-cost production takes place. Here, price discrimination
leads to more markets being served in expectations and unambiguously improves welfare. This
finding resembles the classic Chicago school argument in favor of price discrimination (see
Bork, 1978).
Next to the static setting we analyze a dynamic model in order to investigate the long-run ef-
fects of banning discriminatory wholesale contracts. Extending our model to a long-run analysis
in the spirit of DeGraba (1990), we identify another channel through which uniform pricing can
improve welfare: if downstream firms are allowed to invest into the (expected) efficiency in pro-
duction, uniform pricing results in higher investment incentives, thereby potentially leading to
overall higher welfare. This conjecture is confirmed for the case of linear demand downstream.
We demonstrate robustness of our main result—that is, a ban on price discrimination being
welfare improving even when nonlinear wholesale contracts are feasible—in several directions.
Most importantly, we introduce competition between intermediate firms in our static setting in
order to allow for the possibility of a secondary line injury, i.e., one downstream firm being
placed at a competitive disadvantage. Given that competition is not too tough, banning price
discrimination is socially desirable. Moreover, in order to allow for the manufacturer’s pricing
behavior also causing primary-line injuries in the upstream market, we augment the basic model
by assuming that downstream firms can purchase the essential input not only from the manu-
as an active tool [for] [...] prohibiting, and fining heavily the parties to [...] agreements that prevent parallel trade
between member states”.
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facturer but also from a competitive fringe. Most of our findings are robust toward this kind
of upstream competition. In particular, for linear demand, a ban on discriminatory wholesale
tariffs improves welfare for a wide range of parameter values.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature. In
Section 3, we introduce our basic model with a monopolistic input supplier and downstream
firms operating in separate markets. This model is analyzed in Section 4. In Section 5, we
extend the basic model to a long-run analysis by allowing for downstream firms to invest in
reduction of production cost before contracting takes place. After allowing for a continuous
type distribution for downstream firms in Section 6, we discuss in Section 7 to what extent our
findings carry over the case of downstream competition. Section 8 augments the basic model
by assuming that the upstream supplier is constrained by the threat of demand-side substitution.
We conclude in Section 9. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2. RELATED LITERATURE
There has been considerable back and forth in the literature regarding the welfare effects of
banning third-degree price discrimination in intermediate-good markets. This literature was
initiated by Katz (1987), who shows that price discrimination reduces welfare unless it prevents
inefficient backward integration by the downstream chain. DeGraba (1990) extends Katz’s
model to a long-run analysis where downstream firms can invest into cost reduction. Here, price
discrimination does not only decrease welfare in the short run, but also is detrimental in the long
run. The intuition behind these results is that the “wrong” firm—the less efficient one—receives
a discount under price discrimination.6 While the above articles assume that the manufacturer is
an unconstrained monopolist, Inderst and Valletti (2009) and O’Brien (forthcoming) relax this
assumption. In Inderst and Valletti the manufacturer is constrained by the threat of demand-side
substitution. Here, the more efficient firm receives a discount under price discrimination. As a
result—in the long run—consumers benefit and social surplus increases if price discrimination
is permitted and demand is linear. O’Brien assumes that wholesale prices are determined by
bilateral negotiations between the manufacturer and downstream firms. This also gives rise to
circumstances where price discrimination is socially desirable.7
All the aforementioned articles restrict attention to linear wholesale prices. Thus, with linear
wholesale tariffs the welfare results regarding a ban on price discrimination are mixed. Among
the few exceptions which consider pricing schemes more complex than linear wholesale prices,
in contrast, the predominant opinion is that banning discriminatory wholesale pricing is detri-
mental for welfare. O’Brien and Shaffer (1994) assume that firms can bargain over the terms of
a two-part supply tariff. Banning price discrimination renders retailer bargaining power useless
and restores the manufacturer’s market power, resulting in higher marginal input prices for all
downstream firms under uniform pricing than under price discrimination. Thus, a ban on price
discrimination is harmful for consumers and reduces total welfare. A similar model is analyzed
by Rey and Tirole (2007). Here, with the manufacturer having all the bargaining power, “non-
6Similar results are obtained by Yoshida (2000) and Valletti (2003).
7Mixed welfare results regarding price discrimination in input markets are also obtained by Herweg and Müller
(forthcoming), who allow for endogenous determination of the structure of the downstream industry.
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discrimination laws [...] reduce consumer surplus and total welfare by enabling the monopolist
to commit” (p.32).8 Inderst and Shaffer (2009) abstract from any commitment problems and
assume that the offered two-part tariffs are publicly observable. Focusing on asymmetric down-
stream firms, discriminatory contracts are shown to amplify differences in downstream firms’
competitiveness. Again, a ban on price discrimination tends to raise all final-good prices and
thus to reduce total output. In consequence, banning price discrimination reduces consumer
surplus and total welfare. Lastly, Arya and Mittendorf (2010) show a ban on discriminatory
two-part tariffs to be always welfare harming when downstream firms operate in multiple prod-
uct markets. Thus, while the above “insight raises [...] serious concerns about the efficacy of the
Robinson-Patman Act” (O’Brien and Schaffer, 1994, p.314) or its analogue in EU competition
law, we find that, when downstream firms have private information, the reservation toward dis-
criminatory pricing practices embodied in these legal enactments may well be warranted even
if nonlinear pricing schemes are feasible.
Considering a model with network effects and inelastic demand, Giardino-Karlinger and
Motta (forthcoming) find that third-degree price discrimination can be welfare harming if whole-
sale tariffs more copmlex than linear pricing are considered. In our model there are no network
effects and demand is elastic, which implies that double marginalization is an issue.
3. THE MODEL
Consider a vertically related industry where the upstream market is monopolized by manufac-
turerM . The manufacturer produces an essential input that is supplied to the downstream sector.
For simplicity, we assume that the manufacturer produces quantity q at constant marginal cost,
K > 0. There are two downstream firms, i ∈ {1, 2}, that can transform one unit of the input
into one unit of the final good.
We assume that downstream firms operate in distinct and independent markets, i.e., each
downstream firm is a local monopolist—we comment on this assumption below and relax it
in a later section.. Downstream markets are identical in size and characterized by the inverse
demand function P (q), which is strictly decreasing, twice differentiable where P > 0, and
satisfies the standard assumption P ′(q) < min{0,−qP ′′(q)} where P > 0.9
Downstream firm i produces at constant marginal cost and without fixed costs. The marginal
cost of production is either high or low, ci ∈ {cL, cH} with 0 ≤ cL < cH < P (0) −K. The
last inequality guarantees that the joint-surplus maximizing quantity of a vertically integrated
firm is strictly positive.
Let αi denote the probability that firm i produces at low marginal cost. Ex ante firm 1 is
more likely to produce at low marginal cost than firm 2, i.e., 0 < α2 < α1 < 1. Its type—i.e.,
its marginal cost of production—is private information of the respective downstream firm. The
manufacturer only knows the probability αi, i ∈ {1, 2}, with which downstream firm i is the
low-cost type.
8Building on the Rey-Tirole model and assuming that the manufacturer competes against a competitive fringe,
Caprice (2006) shows that a ban on price discrimination leads to an increase in welfare if the fringe is sufficiently
efficient.
9See, for example, Vives (1999).
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The manufacturer can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the downstream firms.10 With down-
stream firms operating in independent markets and with the type space being identical for
both downstream firms, without loss of generality, the manufacturer offers downstream firm
i ∈ {1, 2} a direct mechanism Γi = 〈(qLi, tLi), (qHi, tHi)〉, that specifies a quantity, q ∈ R≥0,
and a transfer from firm i to the manufacturer, t ∈ R, for each feasible type announcement.
With this type of wholesale contracts, the question whether or not a downstream firm is
forced to sell the whole quantity procured is immediately at hand. We assume free disposal
for downstream firms: when having purchased quantity q′ of the input, downstream firm i can
produce any quantity q ∈ [0, q′] of the final output at cost ciq.
The sequence of events is as follows: first, nature draws the cost type for each downstream
firm i ∈ {1, 2}, which thereafter is privately observed. Next, the manufacturer makes a take-it-
or-leave-it offer to each downstream firm. Under price discrimination the manufacturer offers
each downstream firm a possibly different tariff, whereas under uniform pricing one and the
same tariff applies to both firms.11 A downstream firm either chooses one of the two offered
bundles or it rejects the manufacturer’s offer. In case of rejection, the downstream firm obtains
its reservation profit, which is normalized to zero. If the downstream firm accepts a quantity-
transfer pair (q, t), it decides how much of this acquired input to transform into the final good,
and sells the produced output to consumers.
We focus on separate markets in order to isolate the effect of discriminatory wholesale tar-
iffs in the case of asymmetric information from potential competitive effects. From an applied
point of view, this restriction also seems justifiable: besides geographic price discrimination,
a case in which separate markets are a natural assumption, jurisdictions on both sides of the
Atlantic ocean are mostly concerned with whether discriminatory pricing causes a primary-line
or secondary-line injury. Since the comprehensive renumeration of articles by the Treaty of
Lisbon, primary-line and secondary-line injury are addressed in Article 102(b) and (c) EC—
formerly Article 82(b) and (c)—respectively.12 Article 102(b) does not impose the requirement
that a downstream firm has to be placed at a competitive disadvantage in the first place. Ap-
plication of Article 102(c), on the other hand, calls for a downstream firm to be placed at a
disadvantageous position, but recent practice of the EU Commission generally overlooked this
requirement when relying on Article 102(c).13 Likewise, the Robinson-Patman Act in US com-
petition law requires a substantial injury to competition for price discrimination to be deemed
illegal. According to the usually applied Morton Salt rule, however, the standard of proof for
competitive harm in a secondary-line case is rather low—existence of a substantial price differ-
10The assumption of the manufacturer having all the bargaining power, “which arguably can be justified on the
grounds that for antitrust purposes the considerations of price discrimination in intermediate-goods markets is
primarily relevant if the supplier enjoys a dominant position” (Inderst and Shaffer (2009), p.4) is common in the
extant literature. The only exceptions are O’Brien and Shaffer (1994) and O’Brien (2008).
11As noted by Inderst and Shaffer (2009), another way to model uniform pricing would be to assume that the
manufacturer can offer a menu of tariffs, as long as the same menu is offered to both downstream firms. In our
setup the manufacturer cannot benefit from offering a menu of nonlinear tariffs, since downstream firms cannot
be screened according to their ex ante efficiency.
12While the first type of price discrimination involves discrimination on the part of a dominant firm with the ob-
jective of excluding rival competitors, the latter type refers to the charging of different prices to downstream
competitors thereby placing one or more of them at a competitive disadvantage relative to others.
13As criticized by, for example, Geradin and Petit (2005), when dealing with cases involving primary-line injury
price discrimination, the EU Commission often relies on Article 102(c) EC—instead of Article 102(b) EC—and
usually tends to ignore the requirement that the pricing practice in question has to put one downstream firm at a
competitive disadvantage.
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ence for a substantial period of time is sufficient. (FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37)14
4. THE ANALYSIS
Let q∗(c) = argmaxq≥0{(P (q)−c)q} denote the quantity optimally produced by a downstream
firm that operates at marginal cost c. It is readily verified that q∗(·) is strictly decreasing in c,
such that q∗(cH) < q∗(cL). Due to free disposal, downstream firm i’s maximum profit when
faced with tupel (q, t) is pi(q, ci)− t, where
pi(q, ci) = [P (min{q, q∗(ci)})− ci] min{q, q∗(ci)}. (1)
Thus, downstream firm i’s gross profits pi(q, ci) are strictly increasing and strictly concave in
q on [0, q∗(ci)) and constant for q ≥ q∗(ci). Moreover, a low-cost downstream firm benefits
more from an increase in the quantity of the input than a high-cost downstream firm. That is,
formally pi(q, ci) satisfies the following single-crossing property:
Lemma 1 For all 0 ≤ q′ < q′′ ≤ q∗(cL), pi(q′′, cL)− pi(q′, cL) > pi(q′′, cH)− pi(q′, cH).
Let qJS(c) = argmaxq≥0(P (q)−c)q−Kq denote the optimal quantity produced by a verti-
cally integrated structure comprising of the manufacturer and a downstream firm with marginal
cost c. Under the imposed assumptions we have 0 < qJS(c) < q∗(c). Since qJS(·) is strictly
decreasing in marginal cost c, it holds that
qJS(cH) < min{q∗(cH), qJS(cL)} ≤ max{q∗(cH), qJS(cL)} < q∗(cL). (2)
4.1. Discriminatory Offers
Suppose M is not restricted to offering the same wholesale tariffs to both downstream firms.
Since downstream firms operate in independent markets, M solves two independent maximiza-
tion problems. Thus, when contracting with a downstream firm that produces at low costs with
probability α, M offers this firm a wholesale mechanism Γ = 〈(qL, tL), (qH , tH)〉 that maxi-
mizes expected upstream profits,
ΠD(qL, qH , tL, tH) = α[tL −KqL] + (1− α)[tH −KqH ] . (3)
subject to the constraints that Γ is truthful and individually rational.
The wholesale mechanism is truthful if and only if it satisfies the incentive compatibility
constraints for both cost types, i.e., each cost type has to prefer its own designated bundle over
the bundle designated to the other type. Formally,
pi(qL, cL)− tL ≥ pi(qH , cL)− tH , (ICL)
pi(qH , cH)− tH ≥ pi(qL, cH)− tL . (ICH )
14Only in the recent Volvo case, the Supreme Court for the first time required actual proof of retailers competing
for the same customers in order to establish competitive harm compatible with the Morton Salt rule, thereby
overruling the decision of a lower court. (Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc.
(04-905), 546 U.S. 164, 2006). For a more elaborate discussion of this point see Luchs et al. (2010).
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Moreover, the mechanism has two satisfy the individual rationality constraints, i.e., for each
cost type the designated quantity transfer tuple has to yield nonnegative profits:
pi(qL, cL)− tL ≥ 0 , (IRL)
pi(qH , cH)− tH ≥ 0 . (IRH )
Implications of free disposal.—An important implication of free disposal is that in the opti-
mum we must have qH ≤ q∗(cH). To see this, assume the opposite, i.e., the optimal contract
stipulates q′H > q∗(cH). Then, leaving qL and transfers tL and tH unchanged, M could offer
the high-cost type the lower quantity q∗(cH). First, this change obviously does not affect (IRL).
Moreover, due to free disposal, we have pi(q′H , cH) = pi(q∗(cH), cH), which implies that (IRH )
and (ICH ) are also left unchanged. Last, this decrease in the quantity offered to the high-cost
type strictly relaxes (ICL) because pi(q∗(cH), cL) < pi(q′H , cL). Thus, all constraints remain
satisfied under this new contract, but upstream cost of production is strictly lower than under the
original contract, contradicting its optimality. Analogous reasoning reveals that in the optimum
we have qL ≤ q∗(cL).
Implications of incentive compatibility.—Combining and rearranging both incentive compat-
ibility constraints, (ICL) and (ICH ), yields
pi(qL, cL)− pi(qH , cL) ≥ tL − tH ≥ pi(qL, cH)− pi(qH , cH). (4)
As usual, incentive compatibility imposes the following monotonicity requirement: in the op-
timal contract we must have qH ≤ qL. It follows that pi(qL, cH) ≥ pi(qH , cH), which in turn
implies that tL − tH ≥ 0.
The implications of free disposal and incentive compatibility are summarized in the following
lemma:
Lemma 2 The optimal contract satisfies the following monotonicity constraint:
qH ≤ min{qL, q∗(cH)} ≤ max{qL, q∗(cH)} ≤ q∗(cL). (MON)
If (IRH ) and (ICL) are satisfied, then (IRL) also holds. Since the incentive compatibility
constraints limit only the differences in transfers and not the absolute values, we can conclude
that (IRH ) is binding at the optimum. The remaining incentive compatibility constraint, (ICH ),
then holds as long as the monotonicity requirement qH ≤ qL is met.
Hence, the transfers tH and tL are uniquely determined by (IRH ) and (ICL),
tH = pi(qH , cH), (5)
tL = pi(qL, cL)− pi(qH , cL) + pi(qH , cH). (6)
The manufacturer’s problem consists of choosing quantities qL and qH to maximize upstream
profits under a discriminatory pricing regime,
ΠD(qL, qH) = α {[P (qL)− cL]qL − qH(cH − cL)−KqL}
+ (1− α) {[P (qH)− cH ]qH −KqH} (7)
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subject to the monotonicity requirement (MON). Setting the partial derivative of ΠD(·) with
respect to qL equal to zero yields
qDL = q
JS(cL) . (8)
This is the well-known no-distortion-at-the-top result: the low-cost type produces the quantity
that maximizes the joint surplus of the integrated structure.
The quantity sold to a high-cost downstream firm is distorted downwards in order to cut back
on the information rent paid to a low-cost firm. The magnitude of the downward distortion
depends on the probability with which M deals with a low-cost downstream firm. If it is suffi-
ciently unlikely that the downstream firm produces at high cost, then M will offer the high-cost
type a quantity equal to zero. Formally, due to strict concavity of upstream revenues with re-
spect to qH as long as P (q) > 0, M will offer the high-cost type a quantity equal to zero if and
only if
∂ΠD
∂qH
∣∣∣∣
qH=0
≤ 0 ⇐⇒ α ≥ αˆ := P (0)− cH −K
P (0)− cL −K . (9)
For α < αˆ, on the other hand, the optimal quantity sold to the high-cost type, qˆD(α), is strictly
positive and satisfies the following first-order condition:
P (qˆD(α))− cH + P ′(qˆD(α))qˆD(α) = K + α
1− α(cH − cL) . (10)
Obviously, qˆD(α) is strictly decreasing in α and limαց0 qˆD(α) = qJS(cH). Intuitively, as the
probability of dealing with a low-cost downstream firm becomes smaller, M chooses the quan-
tity offered to the high-cost type closer to the joint-surplus maximizing quantity qJS(cH). If,
on the other hand, the probability of contracting with a low-cost downstream firm is sufficiently
high, thenM prefers to offer a zero quantity to the high-cost type, which eliminates information
rents and in turn allows M to extract all the surplus from the interaction with a low-cost type.
Note that the quantities qˆD(α) and qDL satisfy the monotonicity constraint (MON).
Proposition 1 Under discriminatory wholesale tariffs, (i) qDL = qJS(cL) and (ii) qDH(α) =
qˆD(α) if α < αˆ and zero otherwise.
It is worthwhile to point out that αˆ approaches 1 as cH − cL tends to zero. Put verbally, if
the difference in possible retail costs is not too high, then both cost types are very likely to be
served by the manufacturer.
4.2. Uniform Pricing
Suppose third-degree price discrimination in the intermediate good market is banned. In this
case, M has to offer the same menu to both downstream firms, i.e., Γ1 = Γ2. Since this restric-
tion leaves the set of incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints unchanged,
all the above considerations—Lemma 2 in particular—also apply in this situation. Therefore,
M chooses quantities qL and qH in order to maximize upstream profits,
ΠU (qL, qH) = αΣ {[P (qL)− cL]qL − qH(cH − cL)−KqL}
+ (2− αΣ) {[P (qH)− cH ]qH −KqH} , (11)
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where αΣ := α1 + α2. Though imprecise, we will refer to αΣ as the overall probability of
contracting with a low-cost downstream firm. Differentiation of ΠU (·) with respect to qL reveals
that the no-distortion-at-the-top result carries over to a nondiscriminatory pricing regime,
qUL = q
JS(cL) . (12)
Analogous reasoning to the discriminatory pricing regime reveals that the quantity offered to the
high-cost type decreases in the “average probability” of contracting with a low-cost downstream
firm, αΣ/2. Once this probability exceeds the threshold αˆ, M prefers not to serve the high-cost
type. Formally, M offers a zero quantity to high-cost downstream firms if and only if
∂ΠU
∂qH
∣∣∣∣
qH=0
≤ 0 ⇐⇒ αΣ
2
≥ αˆ. (13)
For αΣ/2 < αˆ, the quantity offered to high-cost types, qˆU (αΣ), satisfies
P (qˆU (αΣ))− cH + P ′(qˆU (αΣ))qˆU (αΣ) = K + αΣ/2
1− αΣ/2(cH − cL) . (14)
Note that qˆU (αΣ) is strictly decreasing in αΣ and limαΣց0 qˆU (αΣ) = qJS(cH). Thus, (MON)
is satisfied. In order to summarize the above observations, let
αˆ1(α2) := 2αˆ− α2 (15)
denote the value of α1 which, for a given value of α2, results in an average probability of
contracting with a low-cost firm equal to αˆ.
Proposition 2 Under a uniform wholesale tariff, (i) qDL = qJS(cL), and (ii) qUH(αΣ) = qˆU (αΣ)
if α1 < αˆ1(α2) and zero otherwise.
4.3. Welfare
We now turn to the welfare implications of banning price discrimination. Welfare, which in
general depends on the pricing regime and is ex ante stochastic, is defined as the sum of con-
sumer and producer surplus, W =
∑2
i=1{
∫ qi
0 P (z)dz − (ci + K)qi}. Let the difference in
expected welfare between the discriminatory pricing regime and the uniform pricing regime be
∆W := E[WD] − E[WU ]. Since there is no-distortion-at-the-top under either regime, ∆W
depends only on the quantities produced by high-cost retailers. Formally,
∆W := ∆W (α1, α2)
=
2∑
i=1
(1− αi)
[∫ qDH(αi)
qU
H
(α1+α2)
P (z)dz − (cH +K)(qDH(αi)− qUH(α1 + α2))
]
. (16)
According to the following lemma, the quantity offered to high-cost firms under uniform pric-
ing, which is determined by th average probability of contracting with a low-cost firm, is brack-
eted by the quantities offered to the high-cost types under price discrimination, which are de-
termined by the individual probability of producing at low cost.
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Lemma 3 qDH(α1) ≤ qUH(αΣ) ≤ qDH(α2) < qJS(cH).
Thus, from Propositions 1 and 2 it follows that we can distinguish the following four cases, as
depicted in Figure 1:
(I) 0 < qDH(α1) < qUH(αΣ) < qDH(α2), which holds if α2 < α1 < αˆ;
(II) 0 = qDH(α1) < qUH(αΣ) < qDH(α2), which holds if α2 < αˆ ≤ α1 < αˆ1(α2);
(III) 0 = qDH(α1) = qUH(αΣ) < qDH(α2), which holds if α2 < αˆ ≤ αˆ1(α2) ≤ α1;
(IV) 0 = qDH(α1) = qUH(αΣ) = qDH(α2), which holds if αˆ ≤ α2 < α1.
α1
α2
α1 = α2
αˆ
αˆ
αˆ1(α2)
1
1
I
II
III IV
Figure 1: Welfare comparison.
α1
α2
α1 = α2
αˆ
αˆ
αˆ1(α2)
1
1
∆W < 0
∆W > 0 ∆W = 0
Figure 2: Linear demand.
In case (IV), with M never serving a high-cost downstream firm irrespective of the pricing
regime, we trivially have ∆W = 0. Therefore, in what follows we focus on cases (I) - (III), i.e.,
we restrict attention to α2 < αˆ.
Define the expected change in quantity as ∆Q := E[QD] − E[QU ], where Qr denotes the
aggregate quantity of the final good produced under pricing regime r ∈ {D,U}. With this
notation, we are prepared to state the main finding of this section.
Proposition 3 Suppose that α2 < αˆ. If
(i) α1 < αˆ1(α2), then ∆Q ≤ 0 implies ∆W < 0;
(ii) α1 ≥ αˆ1(α2), then ∆W > 0.
Moreover, for αˆ < α1 < αˆ1(α2) ∆W is strictly increasing in α1.
What is the intuition behind the welfare results presented in Proposition 3? In case (III)—part
(ii) of Proposition 3—to cut back on information rents, M assigns a zero quantity to the high-
cost type of firm 1 under price discrimination and to high-cost downstream firms in general
under uniform pricing. With high-cost production never taking place under uniform pricing,
price discrimination leads to more markets being served (in expectation), thereby benefiting
welfare in the spirit of the classic Chicago school argument against non-discrimination clauses.
In cases (I) and (II)—part (ii) of Proposition 3—it is not clear which pricing regime results in
higher expected welfare due to opposing effects. In the case of high-cost production, the quan-
tity sold in market 2 is lower under uniform pricing than under price discrimination whereas
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the quantity sold in market 1 is higher under uniform pricing than under price discrimination—
market 1 is not even served under price discrimination in case (II). Even though a general wel-
fare result cannot be derived in these cases, we can establish a sufficient condition—resembling
Schmalensee’s (1981) output test—for uniform pricing to improve welfare: if price discrimina-
tion does not lead to an expansion of expected total output, then expected welfare dincreases if
price discrimination is banned.15
The conjecture that banning price discrimination can be welfare enhancing is supported
by analyzing case (II) in more detail. According to the final statement of Proposition 3, in
case (II), the difference in expected welfare between the two pricing regimes decreases as the
probability of firm 1 to be the low-cost type decreases. This finding suggests that banning
price discrimination—even with more sophisticated pricing schemes being at the manufac-
turer’s disposal—can switch in case (II) from being detrimental for welfare to being welfare
enhancing. In case (II), both markets are always served under uniform pricing, whereas under
price discrimination market 1 is served only when firm 1 produces at low cost. Banning price
discrimination—and thus ensuring that both markets are served irrespective of realized retail ef-
ficiencies, however, comes at the cost of a more severe downward distortion in the quantity sold
in market 2 in the case of high costs. Since the manufacturer trades off minimizing information
rents paid to low-cost types versus maximizing the surplus generated with high-cost types, the
downward distortion in quantity qUH becomes more pronounced as it becomes more likely that
firm 1 is a low-cost firm. Thus, in case (II), for high values of α1 we would expect welfare
to be lower under uniform pricing than under price discrimination because of a much stronger
downward distortion in the quantity offered to firm 2’s high-cost type. If α1 is low, on the other
hand, then the negative effect of banning price discrimination on qUH is small and the positive
effect of more markets being served should outbalance. While not to be obtained in general, as
we will show next, this conjecture holds true for a linear demand function.
4.4. An Application with Linear Demand
Suppose the inverse demand function is linear, P (q) = max{0, 1 − q}, and assume that cH +
K < 1. In this case, it is readily verified that qJS(cH) = 1−cH−K2 , q
D
H(α) = max{0, qJS(cH)−
α
1−α
cH−cL
2 }, and qUH(αΣ) = max{0, qJS(cH) − αΣ/21−αΣ/2
cH−cL
2 }. A linear inverse demand
function allows us to rewrite the difference in expected welfare as
∆W =
2∑
i=1
(1− αi)(qDH(αi)− qUH(αΣ))
[
(1− cH −K)− q
D
H(αi) + q
U
H(αΣ)
2
]
. (17)
Tedious but straightforward calculations then yield the following result.
Proposition 4 Suppose P (q) = max{0, 1 − q}, cH + K < 1, and α2 < αˆ. Let αW1 (α2) be
implicitly defined by ∆W (αW1 (α2), α2) ≡ 0. Then,
(i) ∆W < 0 for α1 < αW1 (α2);
(ii) ∆W > 0 for α1 > αW1 (α2).
15This insight is well-known from the literature analyzing third-degree price discrimination in final goods mar-
kets. A series of papers elaborates on Schmalensee’s basic insight, see Varian (1985), Schwartz (1990), Malueg
(1993), and Aguirre et al. (2010).
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In summary, there exists a unique cutoff, αW1 (α2), below which banning price discrimination
strictly improves welfare. As is proved in the Appendix, this threshold, which passes through
(α1, α2) = (αˆ, αˆ), is strictly decreasing in α2 with a slope strictly between -1 and 0, as is
illustrated in Figure 2.
Part (i) of Proposition 4 is in contrast to findings in the extant literature on third-degree price
discrimination under nonlinear wholesale tariffs: without private information of downstream
firms, a ban on price discrimination is found to unambiguously reduce welfare if the manu-
facturer is not restricted to linear prices. Inderst and Shaffer (2009), for instance, consider a
manufacturer who is perfectly informed about the retail costs of two asymmetric downstream
firms. This manufacturer offers each downstream firm a different two-part tariff under price dis-
crimination, but is restricted to offer only a single two-part tariff under uniform pricing. In this
framework, a ban on price discrimination reduces welfare. For the case of separate markets—
Proposition 6 of Inderst and Shaffer—the optimal discriminatory two-part tariffs maximize the
profits of the integrated structure: both marginal wholesale prices equal the manufacturer’s
marginal production costs and the manufacturer extracts the generated profits fully via the fran-
chise fees because there is no asymmetric information. Under uniform pricing the manufacturer
faces a trade-off between efficiency and rent extraction, which leads him to charge a marginal
wholesale price above marginal cost of production. As a result, both downstream firms acquire
a quantity lower than the optimal quantities from the integrated structurer’s point of view, which
reduces welfare. Our finding shows that the strong welfare result of Inderst and Shaffer is an
artifact of the symmetric information case. Suppose α2 is close to zero and α1 is close to one
but below αW1 (·). In this scenario, downstream firm 1 is very likely to be a low-cost firm and
downstream firm 2 is very likely to be a high-cost firm.16 Thus, this scenario is close to the
separate markets case analyzed by Inderst and Shaffer. Nevertheless, according to Proposition
4, when downstream firms have private information, a ban on price discrimination increases
welfare, which is the complete opposite to the finding of Inderst and Shaffer (2009). In this
sense, introducing only “little” asymmetric information can fundamentally alter previous wel-
fare results.
What do we learn from Proposition 4 for a case-based approach regarding discriminatory
nonlinear wholesale tariffs? If the regulation authority need not be overly concerned about the
possibility of one or the other market not being served under either pricing regime, then—at
least for linear demand—banning price discrimination is socially desirable. Remember that
the area where both markets are served irrespective of the pricing regime is quite large if the
difference in retail costs between a high-cost and a low-cost firm is relatively low, i.e., αˆ is
large. Thus, for relatively small differences in ex post retail costs and if the demand function
is sufficiently linear in the relevant range of prices, then usual legal practice in the EU and
the US—which is to perceive the application of different wholesale conditions for identical
transactions with different trading partners as illegal—often improves welfare.
16Since αW1 (0) < 1, the likelihood of firm 1 being a low-cost firm cannot be arbitrarily close to 1. Note, however,
that α, which increases as the difference in possible retail costs decreases, imposes a lower bound for αW1 (0).
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4.5. Private Information about Demand
Our model can also be interpreted as a model where downstream firms are privately informed
about their own demand rather than their marginal cost of production. Suppose that downstream
firms are symmetric regarding their production cost, i.e., each downstream firm produces with
constant marginal cost cL. There are, however, two potential states of demand for each down-
stream firm, a low-demand state and a high-demand state. A downstream firm in the high-
demand state faces (inverse) demand P (q). A downstream firm in the low-demand state, on the
other hand, faces (inverse) demand P˜ (q) = max{P (q) − (cH − cL), 0}, i.e., downstream de-
mand is shifted downward by an amount cH−cL. Obviously, the profits of a downstream firm in
the high-demand state are identical to those of a low-cost downstream firm in our previous anal-
ysis where downstream firms are privately informed about their respective cost of production,
pi(q; high demand) = pi(q; cL). Likewise, the profit of a downstream firm in the low-demand
state coincides with the profits of a high-cost downstream firm in our previous analysis,17
pi(q; low demand) = [P˜ (q)− cL]q = [P (q)− cH ]q = pi(q; cH).
Which demand state a particular downstream firm faces is assumed to be private information of
that downstream firm. Letting αi denote the ex ante probability that firm i is in the high-demand
state, we assume that α2 < α1. Since the ex ante profit functions are the same as in the case of
private information regarding downstream production cost, downstream behavior is unchanged
and the optimal wholesale mechanism is identical under both interpretations. Moreover, welfare
in the high-demand market is W (q; high demand) =
∫ q
0 P (q) dq − qcL and in the low-demand
market is
W (q; low demand) =
∫ q
0
P˜ (q) dq − qcL =
∫ q
0
P (q) dq − qcH . (18)
Thus, also welfare is unaffected by this reinterpretation of the model such that our results do
not change when downstream firms are privately informed regarding their demand conditions.
5. LONG-RUN ANALYSIS
For linear wholesale prices, DeGraba (1990) pointed out a further channel through which dif-
ferences in the pricing regime can translate into differences in social welfare: with the more
efficient downstream firm being discriminated against, price discrimination leads to lower in-
centives for downstream firms to invest into a more efficient retail technology, thereby harming
welfare not only in the short run but also in the long run. In this section, we show that a ban on
price discrimination increases downstream firms’ incentives to invest into cost reduction also
when nonlinear wholesale contracts are in place.18
Specifically, suppose that initially both downstream firms produce at high cost with certainty.
At some preliminary stage 0, before the manufacturer makes its offers, both downstream firms
17Though somewhat imprecise, this statement is correct for the relevant range where downstream profits are non-
negative. A similar qualification applies below regarding welfare in a low-demand market.
18In order to maintain our formulation of privately informed downstream firms, we do not follow the usual notion
that a downstream firm can reduce its production costs with certainty when investing a given amount of money,
but allow for a stochastic R&D technology.
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can simultaneously invest into R&D. If the research of a downstream firm is successful, then
this downstream firm produces at low cost cL; otherwise, this downstream firm continues to
operate at high cost cH . Suppose that if a downstream firm incurs investment cost ψ(α), then
the research is successful with probability α, where ψ(0) = ψ′(0) = 0 and ψ′′(·) ≥ 0.19
Thus, in a sense, α reflects a downstream firm’s research intensity. The investment into R&D
is observed by the manufacturer. Whether the research was successful, however, is private
information of each downstream firm. We focus on symmetric equilibria in pure strategies. In
order to obtain a clear-cut finding with respect to the difference in investment incentives under
the two pricing regimes, we assume that downstream marginal revenue is concave.
Assumption 1 3P ′′′(q) + qP ′′(q) ≤ 0, whenever P > 0.
Remember that transfers charged by the manufacturer are pinned down by (IRH ) and (ICL).
Given R&D intensities αi and αj , downstream firm i’s expected profit at the investment stage
under pricing regime r ∈ {D,U} is
pir0(αi) = αi(cH − cL)qrH(αi, αj)− ψ(αi), (19)
where qrH(αi, αj) denotes the quantity offered to firm i’s high-cost type under pricing regime
r. Taking the derivative of (19) with respect to αi yields the following first-order condition:
qrH(αi, αj)(cH − cL) + αi(cH − cL)
∂qrH(αi, αj)
∂αi
= ψ′(αi). (20)
How strong the quantity assigned to the high-cost type of downstream firm i reacts to a change
in the probability of this downstream firm producing at low cost depends on the pricing regime.
Price Discrimination.—Under price discrimination, we have qDH(αi, αj) = qDH(αi), as de-
fined in Proposition 1. Here, each downstream firm solves an independent optimization problem
at the investment stage. Obviously, the optimal investment intensity under price discrimination
satisfies αD ∈ (0, αˆ), such that qDH(α) is characterized by (10). Inserting dqDH/dαi—obtained
by differentiating (10) with respect to αi—into the first-order condition (20) yields
qDH(α
D)(cH − cL) + α
D
(1− αD)2
(cH − cL)2
2P ′(qDH(α
D)) + qDH(α
D)P ′′(qDH(α
D))
= ψ′(αD). (21)
Equation (21) implicitly characterizes the optimal investment level of a downstream firm un-
der price discrimination. Notice, we have assumed that the downstream marginal revenue is
decreasing , i.e., 2P ′(·) + qP ′′(·) < 0 whenever P > 0.
Uniform Pricing.—Under uniform pricing, the quantity assigned to a high-cost downstream
firm depends on both firms’ investment levels, qUH(αi, αj) = qUH(αΣ). Thus, the optimal in-
vestment of a downstream firm depends not only on its own but also on its rival’s investment.
19For the case of zero investment cost, ψ(αi) ≡ 0, we assume that if a downstream firm is indifferent between
several investment levels, it chooses the lowest of these investment levels. For 2αˆ < 1, this tie-breaking rule
allows us to avoid unintuitive equilibria under uniform pricing in which both downstream firms choose very
high investment levels—because, given firm j’s very high investment level, firm i’s choice of investment has no
influence on the quantity allocation—and makes zero profits in equilibrium.
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Obviously, the investment level in a symmetric equilibrium αU < αˆ, and thus qH(αΣ) is de-
fined by (14). By taking the partial derivative of (14) with respect to αi, we obtain ∂qUH/∂αi.
The investment level in a symmetric equilibrium under uniform pricing, αU , is implicitly char-
acterized by
qUH(2α
U )(cH−cL)+ α
U
2(1− αU )2
(cH − cL)2
2P ′(qUH(2α
U )) + qUH(2α
U )P ′′(qUH(2α
U ))
= ψ′(αU ), (22)
which is obtained by inserting ∂qUH/∂αi into (20).
Investment Incentives.—On the one hand, a higher investment makes it more likely that the
downstream firm produces at low costs, and thus obtains a positive information rent. On the
other hand, the information rent decreases in a downstream firm’s investment, because the
quantity assigned to a high-cost firm is decreasing in the investment level. Under price dis-
crimination the expected information rent of firm i depends only on its own investment level,
whereas under uniform pricing it depends on the average investment level of both firms. This
makes the manufacturer reacting more strongly—i.e., by cutting back this firm’s information
rent more severely—to an increased investment of firm i under price discrimination than under
uniform pricing. In consequence, permitting discriminatory wholesale contracts stifles down-
stream firms’ incentives to invest into a reduction of their production or retail costs.
Proposition 5 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. A downstream firm’s investment into cost
reduction is higher under uniform pricing than under price discrimination, i.e., 0 < αD < αU .
Welfare.—With investment incentives being higher under uniform pricing than under price
discrimination, it stands to reason that in the long run banning price discrimination is socially
beneficial. While we do not show this in generality, the next finding establishes this conjecture
for a specification with linear demand and zero investment cost.
Proposition 6 Suppose that demand is linear and there are no investment costs, i.e., P (q) =
max{1− q, 0} and ψ(α) ≡ 0 for all α ∈ [0, 1]. Then, in the long run, welfare is higher under
uniform pricing than under price discrimination.
In the long run, with αD < αU < αˆ, both cost types of both downstream firms are always
served. Moreover, with investment incentives being higher under uniform pricing than under
price discrimination, a firm is more likely to produce at low cost under uniform pricing. This
effect supports welfare under uniform pricing compared to price discrimination. With higher
investment incentives under uniform pricing, however, the downward distortion in quantity for
a high-cost firm is higher which reduces welfare under uniform pricing compared to price dis-
crimination. According to Proposition 6, however, the direct effect due to an increased prob-
ability of producing at low costs outweighs the indirect effect of a higher quantity distortion,
thereby making a ban on price discrimination socially desirable in the long-run.
A final remark is in order: with investment incentives being higher under uniform pricing than
under price discrimination and in consequence expected gains from trade being higher under
uniform pricing, banning price discrimination can also be in the interest of the manufacturer.
Uniform pricing can be a valuable commitment device for the manufacturer not to exploit the
relationship specific investment of a downstream firm—at least not as much as under price
discrimination—and thereby reduces the hold-up problem.
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6. CONTINUOUS DISTRIBUTION OF DOWNSTREAM COSTS
In this section, we allow for the marginal cost of production of downstream firm i ∈ {1, 2}
being continuously distributed, i.e., c ∈ [cL, cH ] ≡ C with 0 ≤ cL < cH . Firm i’s cost is ex
ante distributed according to c.d.f. Fi(c) and density fi(c) > 0 for all c ∈ C. We assume that
the cost distributions of the two firms are different in the sense that there exist values of c ∈ C
such that F1(c)/f1(c) 6= F2(c)/f2(c). The two ex ante distributions are known by the upstream
manufacturer, who offers downstream firm i a direct mechanism Γi ≡ 〈(qi(c), ti(c))〉c∈C . For
each feasible type announcement mechanism Γi specifies a quantity qi(c) ∈ R≥0 and a transfer
ti(c) from firm i to the manufacturer. With the main purpose of this continuous-cost case
being to demonstrate robustness of our welfare findings, we focus on linear demand P (q) =
max{1− q, 0}. The manufacturer’s expected profit is given by:
Π =
2∑
i=1
{∫ cH
cL
[ti(c)−Kqi(c)]fi(c) dc
}
. (23)
As before the manufacturer has to satisfy the individual rationality and incentive compatibility
constraints: for all i ∈ {1, 2} and c ∈ C,
qi(c)[1− qi(c)− c]− ti(c) ≥ 0 (IR)
c ∈ argmax
c˜∈C
{qi(c˜)[1− qi(c˜)− c]− ti(c˜)}. (IC)
If price discrimination is banned, then the manufacturer has to satisfy the additional constraint
Γ1 = Γ2. Note that for the manufacturer it is more profitable to contract with low-cost down-
stream firms. This implies that the usual monotonicity requirement, which is necessary to sat-
isfy incentive compatibility, here requires that qi(c) and ti(c) are non-increasing. As it is well-
known, without further assumptions on the type distribution this monotonicity requirement may
be binding which makes the analysis by far more complicated. In this respect, we impose the
following assumption in the spirit of the monotone hazard rate property.
Assumption 2 For all c ∈ C it holds thatFi(c)/fi(c), with i ∈ {1, 2}, and [F1(c)+F2(c)]/[f1(c)
+ f2(c)] are non-decreasing.
Note that Assumption 2 is satisfied if both density functions display weakly decreasing densi-
ties.
Moreover, we focus on cases where—irrespective of the pricing regime—the manufacturer
serves all types of downstream firms, which corresponds to case (I) in the previous analysis.
The following assumption guarantees that this is the case under the optimal mechanisms.
Assumption 3 cH +K < 1− [min{f1(cH), f2(cH)}]−1.
As before, superscripts D and U denote the pricing regime: price discrimination and uniform
pricing, respectively.
Lemma 4 Suppose that Assumptions 2 and 3 hold. If qDi (c) < qDj (c) for i, j ∈ {1, 2} and
i 6= j, then qU (c) ∈ (qDi (c), qDj (c)).
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According to Lemma 4, one market benefits from price discrimination whereas the other market
is harmed compared to uniform pricing for a given cost realization. Nevertheless, for linear
demand we obtain a clear welfare result.
Proposition 7 Suppose that Assumptions 2 and 3 hold. A ban on price discrimination improves
total welfare, i.e., ∆W < 0.
7. DOWNSTREAM COMPETITION
So far, we restricted attention to downstream firms operating in separate markets. Modeling
downstream competition raises the following concerns: Regarding the information structure,
does each downstream firm know its competitor’s cost type or only its own type? In the former
case, the manufacturer can use a mechanism that severely punishes both downstream firms
if their reports regarding their own and their competitor’s cost types do not match, thereby
revealing the downstream firms’ private information without cost. With this type of mechanism
being feasible under both pricing regimes, there is no scope for analyzing the welfare effects
of banning price discrimination. If, on the other hand, downstream firms know only their own
cost types, then the quantity offered to a downstream firm may nevertheless depend on both
downstream firms’ reports. Under price discrimination, for example, the manufacturer now has
eight quantities and eight transfers to specify which raises analytical complexity. Besides being
by far less tractable, contracts with a firm’s transfer depending on quantities procured by both
firms seem hard to reconcile with observed practice.20 But even restricting contracts such that
a firm’s transfers and quantities depend only on its own type does not circumvent the question
whether a firm learns its competitor’s type before or after accepting the upstream firm’s offer,
i.e., whether ex ante or ex post participation constraints matter.
In order to address robustness of our results with regard to downstream competition, we
pursue the last of the above approaches: within a differentiated-goods framework, a firm’s
contract may depend only on its own type, and at the contracting stage downstream firms only
know the distribution of their competitor’s cost. Following Dixit (1979) and Singh and Vives
(1984), we consider a representative consumer with utility function
U(q1, q2) = q1 − 1
2
q21 + q2 −
1
2
q22 − γq1q2 − p1q1 − p2q2, (24)
where γ ∈ [0, 1]. The parameter γ measures to what extent the products of the two downstream
firms are substitutes: for γ = 0, we are back in the case of separate markets, whereas for γ = 1
downstream firms produce perfect substitutes. The resulting inverse demand function for the
commodity produced by firm i ∈ {1, 2} is
P (qi, qj) = 1− qi − γqj , i 6= j. (25)
We focus on cases where both downstream firms are served. In this regard we assume α1 <
αˆ := (1 − cH − K)/(1 − cL − K). Moreover, we restrict attention to situations where the
20Regarding contracts where “retailers’ payments [...] depend on their own and their rivals’ actions [...], [t]here are
many reasons why such contracts may not be feasible, ranging from the costs of enforcement to illegality under
the antitrust statutes.” (O’Brien and Shaffer 1994, p.298)
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free-disposal constraint has no bite, i.e., none of the input offered by M goes to waste. Let
Ej [q] = αjqjL + (1 − αj)qjH denote the expected quantity sold by firm j. Without referring
to a specific pricing regime, the individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints
regarding downstream firm i 6= j resemble those in the analysis of separate markets but now
the expected quantity of firm i’s downstream rival also plays a role:
qiH (1− qiH − γEj [q]− cH)− tiH ≥ 0 (26)
qiL (1− qiL − γEj [q]− cL)− tiL ≥ 0 (27)
qiH (1− qiH − γEj [q]− cH)− tiH ≥ qiL (1− qiL − γEj [q]− cH)− tiL (28)
qiL (1− qiL − γEj [q]− cL)− tiL ≥ qiH (1− qiH − γEj [q]− cL)− tiH (29)
Obviously, incentive compatibility imposes the usual monotonicity requirement, qiH ≤ qiL,
and (IRiL) holds whenever (IRiH ) and (ICiL) are satisfied.
In contrast to the case of separate markets, under price discrimination the manufacturer does
not solve two independent maximization problems anymore. Nevertheless, following standard
procedure works here as well, i.e., upstream profits are maximized over quantities subject to the
above constraints with transfers being pinned down by (IRiH ) and (ICiL). In the optimum, M
offers quantities smaller than in the case of separate markets,
qDiL(γ) = q
JS(cL)− γ
1 + γ
qJS(cH) (30)
and
qDiH(γ) =
1
1 + γ
qJS(cH)− αi
1− αi
cH − cL
2
, (31)
thereby—at least partly—internalizing the externality of downstream competition. Note that the
monotonicity requirement is satisfied. Moreover, if the products are sufficiently differentiated,
then M wants to serve both firms and the quantity offered to either firm is that low such that
free disposal does not impose a binding restriction. Formally, letting qi(qj |ci) denote firm i’s
best reply to firm j’s quantity when producing at cost ci itself, the following holds:
Lemma 5 Let qj ∈ {qDjL(γ), qDjH(γ)}. There exists γD ∈ (0, 1] such that, for γ < γD, (i)
0 < qDiH(γ) < q
D
iL, and (ii) qDiH(γ) < qi(qj |cH) and qDiL(γ) < qi(qj |cL).
Under uniform pricing, next to the above individual rationality and incentive compatibil-
ity constraints for each firm, M faces the additional constraint that q1L = q2L = qL and
q1H = q2H = qH . With incentive compatibility requiring monotonicity, qH ≤ qL, it follows
that E1[q] ≥ E2[q]. In consequence, whenever a particular cost type of firm 2 is willing to
accept M ’s contract offer, so is that cost type of firm 1. Likewise, downward incentive com-
patibility with regard to firm 2 implies downward incentive compatibility with regard to firm
1. Therefore, with (IR2H ) and (IC2L) are more pressing than (IR1H ) and (IC1L), respectively,
standard procedure corresponds to setting transfers that make (IR2H ) and (IC2L) bind.21 Maxi-
mizing upstream profits—with transfers being determined by (IR2H ) and (IC2L)—results in M
21While upward incentive compatibility regarding firm 1 is not satisfied in general under the resulting choice of
transfers, for γ not too large it can be shown that (IC1H ) holds when (IC2L) binds.
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offering quantities
qUL (γ) = q
JS(cL)
4αΣ(2− αΣ)(1 + γ(1− α1))
Λ(γ)
− γ [αΣ(1− α1) + (2− αΣ)α1][(2− αΣ)(1− cH −K)− αΣ(cH − cL)]
Λ(γ)
(32)
and
qUH(γ) = q
JS(cH)
4αΣ(2− αΣ)(1 + γα1)
Λ(γ)
− (cH − cL)2(αΣ)
2(1 + γα1)
Λ(γ)
− γ [αΣ(1− α1) + (2− αΣ)α1]αΣ(1− cH −K)
Λ(γ)
, (33)
where
Λ(γ) = 4αΣ(2− αΣ)(1 + γ)− γ2(αΣ − 2α1)2. (34)
As stated in the following lemma, if the degree of substitutability is not too high, then the above
quantities are strictly positive (i.e., M wants to serve both firms), satisfy the monotonicity
requirement, and free disposal has no bite.
Lemma 6 Let qj ∈ {qDjL(γ), qDjH(γ)}. There exists γU ∈ (0, 1] such that, for γ < γU , (i)
0 < qUH(γ) < q
U
L (γ), and (ii) qUH(γ) < qi(qj |cH) and qUL (γ) < qi(qj |cL).
With transfers being welfare neutral, for a given degree of product differentiation γ, welfare
under pricing regime r ∈ {D,U} amounts to
W r(γ) =
2∑
i=1
(
1− 1
2
qri (γ)− ci −K
)
qri (γ)− γqr1(γ)qr2(γ). (35)
Since for γ = 0 we are back in the case of separate markets with linear (inverse) demand, from
Proposition 4(i) it follows that the difference in expected welfare under both pricing regimes
is strictly negative, ∆W < 0. With the quantities characterized by (30), (31), (32), and (33)
changing smoothly in γ, the following result follows from continuity of W r(γ).
Proposition 8 Suppose α1 < αˆ. There exists γW ∈ (0,min{γD, γU}] such that ∆W (γ) < 0
for γ < γW .
In summary, as long as downstream competition is not overly intense—in the sense of down-
stream firms competing in sufficiently differentiated commodities—banning price discrimina-
tion improves welfare.
8. DEMAND-SIDE SUBSTITUTION
As was recently shown by Inderst and Valletti (2009) and Caprice (2005), the implications of
price discrimination in input markets for pricing decisions and welfare may be reversed if the
assumption of a monopolistic input supplier is relaxed. We augment our basic model with
separate markets by allowing for downstream firms to purchase the essential input not only
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from the manufacturer but also from an alternative source. As we will show, the main effect of
this outside option is to shift rents from the manufacturer to the downstream firms. As a result,
by and large, our findings are robust toward relaxing the assumption of a monopolistic input
supplier.
Following Katz (1987) and Inderst and Valletti (2009), we suppose that a downstream firm,
when rejecting the manufacturer’s offer, can turn to an alternative source of input supply. How
profitable this switch to the alternative supply is for a particular downstream firm depends on
its efficiency in production. If a firm with marginal cost c ∈ {cL, cH} acquires its input from
the alternative supply, then its profits are piA(c), with 0 ≤ piA(cH) < piA(cL).22,23 We assume
that the alternative source of input supply is not too attractive in the sense that the joint surplus
generated by M and either type of downstream firm exceeds that downstream firm’s profit
obtained under the alternative supply.
Assumption 4 For all c ∈ {cL, cH} it holds that: pi(qJS(c), c)−KqJS(c) > piA(c).
We define
φ :=
piA(cL)− piA(cH)
cH − cL , (36)
which declares how much more a low-cost firm benefits from the alternative input supply than
a high-cost firm, relative to the low-cost firm’s cost advantage.24 In order to stick close to our
basic model without alternative supply, we keep cL and cH fixed and assume that any variation
in φ arises due to changes in piA(cL) or piA(cH). For reasons of tractability, we assume that the
outside option is not superior, in the sense that under the optimal contract it is never the upward
incentive constraint that is binding.25 Formally, we impose the following assumption:
Assumption 5 φ ≤ qJS(cL).
Otherwise the model is the same as before. In particular, with M still making take-it-or-
leave-it offers,M ’s objective function remains unchanged. Moreover, facing the usual incentive
compatibility constraints, the optimal wholesale mechanism still has to satisfy monotonicity
constraint (MON) and tL ≥ tH . The individual rationality constraints, however, are not the
same as before due to the existence of an alternative source of supply:
pi(qL, cL)− tL ≥ piA(cL) , (IRAL)
pi(qH , cH)− tH ≥ piA(cH) . (IRAH )
Clearly, ifM prefers to serve only one cost type, then welfare results require a specification of
the alternative input supply. Therefore, in what follows, we restrict attention to cases where M
22One possible interpretation is that there exists a competitive fringe that produces an input good which is substi-
tutable to the manufacturer’s product. The downstream firms can acquire this fringe product at a per-unit cost
of w¯ > 0. In order to switch input suppliers a downstream firm has to incur a fixed cost F ≥ 0. With this
interpretation we obtain piA(ci) := max {0,maxq[P (q)− c− w¯]q − F}
23Here, the manufacturer faces a screening problem with a type-dependent outside option. This class of problems
is thoroughly analyzed, for instance, by Jullien (1996, 2000).
24The case analyzed in Section 4 then corresponds to a special case of the situation where the outside option is
equally attractive for both types, i.e., where φ = 0.
25Thus, we do not consider countervailing incentives in the sense of Lewis and Sappington (1989). Cf. also Tirole
(1988, p.154.)
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serves both types of downstream firms. This allows us to draw welfare implications irrespective
of the particular form the alternative source of supply takes.26 In order to state the discussion
as concise a possible, define αr, with r ∈ {D,U} denoting the pricing regime, as follows:
αD = αi for i ∈ {1, 2} under price discrimination and αU = αΣ under uniform pricing.27
Following the analysis of type-dependent participation constraints in Laffont and Martimort
(2002), under Assumption 5, we have to distinguish three cases. First, for φ ≤ qˆ(αr), the
alternative source of supply is similarly attractive to a high-cost and a low-cost downstream
firm. Hence, this case is similar to the standard case without an outside option: the constraints
(IRAH ) and (ICL) are binding and the quantities are as in the standard case but the transfers are
shifted downwards. Second, for qˆ(αr) < φ ≤ qJS(cH), to ensure the low-cost downstream
firm’s participation, it must receive a higher profit than the information rent it receives in the
first case. The manufacturer achieves this by increasing the information rent which requires
an increase of the quantity offered to a high-cost firm. Formally, the manufacturer chooses qH
such that next to (IRAH ) and (ICL) also (IRAL) is binding. Last, for qJS(cH) < φ ≤ qJS(cL),
the outside option is by far more attractive for a low-cost downstream firm than for a high-
cost downstream firm. Here, the manufacturer does not need to worry about a low-cost firm’s
incentives but about its participation. The optimal contract now satisfies both participation
constraints with equality (IRAH ) and (IRAL) and the incentive constraints are all slack. Hence, in
this case, the quantity offered to each cost type equals the respective joint surplus maximizing
quantity.28
Defining αr(φ) implicitly by
qˆr(αr(φ)) ≡ φ, (37)
the optimal quantities for the manufacturer to offer are summarized in the following proposition.
Figure 3 illustrates the above discussion for the discriminatory pricing regime.
Proposition 9 Suppose that Assumptions 4 and 5 hold and that the upstream firm serves both
types of downstream firms. The optimal wholesale mechanism under pricing regime r ∈ {D,U}
allocates quantities
(i) qrL(αr) = qJS(cL) and qrH(αr) = qˆr(αr) if φ ≤ qJS(cH) and αr ≤ αr(φ);
(ii) qrL(αr) = qJS(cL) and qrH(αr) = φ if φ ≤ qJS(cH) and αr ≥ αr(φ);
(iii) qrL(αr) = qJS(cL) and qrH(αr) = qJS(cH) if qJS(cH) ≤ φ ≤ qJS(cL).
Regarding the welfare effects of banning price discrimination in the presence of an alternative
source of input supply, we distinguish two cases: (a) φ ∈ [qJS(cH), qJS(cL)], and (b) φ <
qJS(cH).
The welfare implications of banning price discrimination in case (a) are trivial: The quantities
offered are the same under both pricing regimes, which implies ∆W = 0.
26A precise account under what circumstances M indeed prefers to serve both cost types of downstream firms is
given in Appendix B.
27Under price discrimination the manufacturer solves two independent maximization problems; one for each down-
stream firm i ∈ {1, 2}. With a slight abuse of notation, we suppress the subscript i for the discriminatory pricing
regime.
28Since we do not allow for countervailing incentives, we do not encounter an upward distortion of the more efficient
firm’s quantity.
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1 αi
φ
qˆD(αi)
(IRL), (IRH )
(ICL), (IRH ), (IRL)
(ICL), (IRH )
φ′
αD(φ′) αˆD
qJS(cH )
qJS(cL)
Figure 3: Binding constraints when M serves both types.
In case (b), while M still prefers to serve both types of each downstream firm under either
regime and offers qJS(cL) to any low-cost downstream firm, the quantity offered to a high-
cost downstream firm depends on both the pricing regime and its ex ante efficiency. More
precisely, under price discrimination firm i, when producing at high cost, is offered quantity
qDH(αi) = qˆ
D(αi) if αi ≤ αD(φ) and quantity qDH(αi) = φ otherwise. Under uniform pricing
M offers qUH(αΣ) = qˆU (αΣ) if αΣ ≤ αU (φ) and qUH(αΣ) = φ otherwise. Define
αU1 (α2;φ) := α
U (φ)− α2, (38)
and note that αU1 (αD(φ);φ) = αD(φ). This gives rise to four cases similar to the four cases
depicted in Figure 1. For α2 > αD(φ) the quantities offered by M are identical under both
pricing regimes such that ∆W = 0. The welfare implications for the remaining cases parallel
those drawn in the standard model without an alternative source of input supply.
Proposition 10 Suppose Assumptions 4 and 5 hold and that φ < qJS(cH). (i) If α2 <
αD(φ) ≤ αU1 (α2;φ) ≤ α1, then ∆W > 0. (ii) If α2 < αD(φ) < α1 < αU1 (α2;φ), then ∆W is
strictly decreasing in α1. (iii) If α2 < α1 ≤ αD(φ), then ∆W < 0 for P (q) = max{1− q, 0}.
The intuition behind the welfare result of Proposition 10 is basically the same as the one behind
Proposition 3. Due to the outside option rents are shifted from the manufacturer to the down-
stream firms, but this shift does not affect total welfare as long as no downstream firm acquires
its input from the fringe supply. Proposition 10 shows that our previous findings are robust
toward relaxing the assumption of an unconstrained manufacturer. In particular, if the potential
differences in retail costs are low, then a ban on price discrimination improves welfare at least
for linear demand, where αD(φ) = [qJS(cH)− φ]/[qJS(cL)− φ] approaches 1 as cH tends to
cL.
Regarding a case-based approach of banning discriminatory wholesale contracts, Proposi-
tion 10 provides a justification for the competition authority to ban discriminatory wholesale
contracts if concerned with a primary-line injury case. Put differently, if a competitor of a
dominant manufacturer files a complaint that the dominant manufacturer uses discriminatory
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wholesale tariffs, then the competition policy agency often is well advised to condemn this
pricing practice. Banning discriminatory wholesale contracts is advisable, however, not to pro-
tect competitors of the dominant manufacturer but to protect consumers.
9. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyze a vertically related industry with asymmetric information between
the upstream and the downstream sector. The main purpose is to inquire into the welfare ef-
fects of banning third-degree price discrimination in intermediate-good markets when nonlinear
pricing schemes are feasible. This question is of immediate practical interest because from a
legal perspective, quantity discounts are commonly regarded as a justifiable pricing strategy of
manufacturers or wholesale firms as long as they are not discriminatory in the sense of applying
different conditions to identical transactions with other trading partners.
While there has been considerable back and forth in the academic literature regarding the
question whether banning price discrimination in intermediate-good markets constitutes a de-
sirable course of policy when wholesale prices are linear, among the few exceptions which
consider nonlinear wholesale pricing schemes the predominant opinion is that banning discrim-
inatory wholesale pricing is detrimental for welfare. In contrast to these findings, we show that
even if nonlinear pricing schemes are feasible, the reservation toward discriminatory pricing
practices embodied in legal enactments may well be warranted when downstream firms have
private information. This result holds irrespective of whether geographic price discrimination,
primary-line injury or secondary-line injury is considered.
A. PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS AND LEMMAS
Proof of Lemma 1:
First, suppose q′ < q′′ < q∗(cH). Then
pi(q′′, cL)− pi(q′, cL) > pi(q′′, cH)− pi(q′, cH)
⇐⇒ [P (q′′)− cL]q′′ − [P (q′)− cL]q′ > [P (q′′)− cH ]q′′ − [P (q′)− cH ]q′
⇐⇒ q′ < q′′. (A.1)
Next, suppose q′ < q∗(cH) ≤ q′′ ≤ q∗(cL). Then
pi(q′′, cL)− pi(q′, cL) > pi(q′′, cH)− pi(q′, cH) = pi(q∗(cH), cH)− pi(q′, cH)
⇐⇒ [P (q′′)− cL]q′′ − [P (q′)− cL]q′ > [P (q∗(cH))− cH ]q∗(cH)− [P (q′)− cH ]q′
⇐⇒ [P (q′′)− cL]q′′ − [P (q∗(cH))− cL]q∗(cH) + [P (q∗(cH))− cL]q∗(cH)
− [P (q′)− cL]q′ > [P (q∗(cH))− cH ]q∗(cH)− [P (q′)− cH ]q′
⇐⇒ pi(q′′, cL)− pi(q∗(cH), cL) + (cH − cL)(q∗(cH)− q′) > 0, (A.2)
where the last inequality holds by q′ < q∗(cH) ≤ q′′ ≤ q∗(cL) and pi(q, cL) being strictly
increasing in q on q ∈ [0, q∗(cL)).
Last, suppose q∗(cH) ≤ q′ < q′′ ≤ q∗(cL). Then
pi(q′′, cL)− pi(q′, cL) > pi(q′′, cH)− pi(q′, cH) = pi(q∗(cH), cH)− pi(q∗(cH), cH) = 0 (A.3)
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holds because pi(q, cL) is strictly increasing in q on q ∈ [0, q∗(cL)).
Proof of Lemma 3:
Inspection of the first-order conditions (10) and (14), together with the definition of qJS(c) and
the fact that
α2 < α1 =⇒ α2
1− α2 <
α1 + α2
2− α1 − α2 <
α1
1− α1 , (A.4)
immediately implies qˆD(α1) < qˆU (α1 + α2) < qˆD(α2) < qJS(cH). The desired statement
then follows from Propositions 1 and 2.
Proof of Proposition 3:
We prove each part of the proposition in turn. To cut back on notation, we will make use of the
following notation: qDHi := qDH(αi) for i ∈ {1, 2}, and qUH := qUH(αΣ).
(i) Note that the expected total output under price discrimination and under uniform pricing
is given by,
E[QD] = α1q
D
L (α1) + (1− α1)qDH(α1) + α2qDL (α2) + (1− α2)qDH(α2) (A.5)
and
E[QU ] = α1q
U
L (αΣ) + (1− α1)qUH(αΣ) + α2qUL (αΣ) + (1− α2)qUH(αΣ), (A.6)
respectively. Thus, ∆Q := E[QD]− E[QU ] is given by
∆Q = (1− α2)[qDH2 − qUH ]− (1− α1)[qUH − qDH1]. (A.7)
The change in expected welfare can be rewritten as follows,
∆W = (1− α2)
∫ qDH2
qU
H
P (z)dz − (1− α1)
∫ qUH
qD
H1
P (z)dz − (cH +K)∆Q. (A.8)
By the usual argument, we can find an upper bound for the first term and a lower bound for the
second term (see Varian, 1985). Hence, the change in expected welfare is bounded from above
by
∆W < (1− α2)P (qUH)
[
qDH2 − qUH
]− (1− α1)P (qUH) [qUH − qDH1]− (cH +K)∆Q. (A.9)
Rearranging the above inequality yields,
∆W < [P (qUH(αΣ))− (cH +K)]∆Q.
We conclude by noting that [P (qUH)− (cH +K)] > 0 because qJS(cH) > qUH ≥ 0.
(ii) With αˆ1(α2) ≤ α1, we have qDH1 = qUH = 0 < qDH2 = qˆD(α2). According to (16), the
difference in expected welfare under the two pricing regimes is
∆W = (1− α2)
[∫ qDH2
0
P (z)dz − (cH +K)qDH2
]
. (A.10)
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The desired result then follows from the first-order condition (10) together with P ′(·) < 0
whenever P (·) > 0:
P (qDH2)− (cH +K) = −P ′(qDH2)qDH2 +
α
1− α(cH − cL) > 0
=⇒ [P (qDH2)− (cH +K)] qDH2 > 0
=⇒
∫ qDH2
0
P (z)dz − (cH +K)qDH2 > 0
(A.11)
Last, we prove the final statement, i.e, in case (II), ∆W is strictly increasing in α1. With
α2 < αˆ < α1 < αˆ1(α2), we have qDH1 = 0 < qUH = qˆU (αΣ) < qDH2 = qˆD(α2). Note that
dqDH1/dα1 = 0. Differentiation of (16) w.r.t. α1 yields
d∆W
dα1
=
[∫ qUH
0
P (z)dz − (cH +K)qUH
]
− (2− αΣ)dq
U
H
dα1
[
P (qUH)− (cH +K)
] (A.12)
With qUH = qˆU (αΣ) being defined by (14), we have dqUH/dα1 < 0. Moreover, with P ′(·) < 0
whenever P (·) > 0, from (14) it follows that
P (qUH)− (cH +K) = −P ′(qUH)qUH +
αΣ
2− (αΣ)(cH − cL) > 0
=⇒
∫ qUH
0
P (z)dz − (cH +K)qUH > 0. (A.13)
Taken together, these observations allow us to conclude that d∆W/dα1 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4:
With ∆W being given by (17), we consider in turn each of the three relevant cases identified in
the main text : (I) α2 < α1 < αˆ; (II) α2 < αˆ ≤ α1 < αˆ1(α2); and (III) α2 < αˆ < αˆ1(α2) ≤
α1. To cut back on notation, we will make use of the following notation: qDHi := qDH(αi) for
i ∈ {1, 2}, qUH := qUH(αΣ), qJSH := qJS(cH), and ∆c := cH − cL.
(I) With α2 < α1 < αˆ we have qDHi = qJSH − αi1−αi
∆c
2 and q
U
H = q
JS
H − αΣ2−αΣ
∆c
2 . Noting that
∆Q = [
∑
i=1,2(1− αi)qDHi]− (2− αΣ)qUH = 0, ∆W < 0 follows from Proposition 3(ii).
(II) With α2 < αˆ ≤ α1 < αˆ1(α2), we have qDH1 = 0, qDH2 = qJSH − α21−α2 ∆c2 and qUH =
qJSH − αΣ2−(αΣ)
∆c
2 . The difference in expected welfare thus equals
∆W = (1− α2)qDH2
{
1− 1
2
qDH2 − (cH +K)
}
− (2− αΣ)qUH
{
1− 1
2
qUH − (cH +K)
}
. (A.14)
Let αW1 (α2) be implicitly defined by
∆W (αW1 (α2), α2) ≡ 0. (A.15)
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Differentiation of A.15 with respect to α2 reveals that
dαW1 (α2)
dα2
[
− (2− αΣ)dq
U
H
dαΣ
{
1− qUH − (cH +K)
}
+ qUH
{
1− 1
2
qUH − (cH +K)
}]
= −(1− α2)dq
D
H2
dα2
(
{
1− qDH2 − (cH +K)
}
+ qDH2
{
1− 1
2
qDH2 − (cH +K)
}
+ (2− αΣ)dq
U
H
dαΣ
{
1− qUH − (cH +K)
}− qUH
{
1− 1
2
qUH − (cH +K)
}
(A.16)
Substituting for qDH2 and qUH , and noting that
dqDH2
dα2
= − 1
(1−α2)2
∆c
2 and
dqUH
dαΣ
= − 2
(2−αΣ)2
∆c
2
yields
dαW1 (α2)
dα2
[
2
2− αΣ
∆c
2
{
qJSH +
αΣ
2− αΣ
∆c
2
}
+
{
qJSH −
αΣ
2− αΣ
∆c
2
}{
3
2
qJSH +
1
2
αΣ
2− αΣ
∆c
2
}]
=
[
1
1− α2
∆c
2
{
qJSH +
α2
1− α2
∆c
2
}
+
{
qJSH −
α2
1− α2
∆c
2
}{
3
2
qJSH +
1
2
α2
1− α2
∆c
2
}]
−
[
2
2− αΣ
∆c
2
{
qJSH +
αΣ
2− αΣ
∆c
2
}
+
{
qJSH −
αΣ
2− αΣ
∆c
2
}{
3
2
qJSH +
1
2
αΣ
2− αΣ
∆c
2
}]
(A.17)
A first important observation is that each term in square brackets is strictly positive, which
implies that dαW1 (α2)/dα2 > −1. Moreover, all the terms with qJSH on the RHS of (A.17)
cancel out, which allows us to rewrite (A.17) as follows:
dαW1 (α2)
dα2
[
2
2− αΣ
∆c
2
{
qJSH +
αΣ
2− αΣ
∆c
2
}
+
{
qJSH −
αΣ
2− αΣ
∆c
2
}{
3
2
qJSH +
1
2
αΣ
2− αΣ
∆c
2
}]
=
(
∆c
2
)2{α2(2− α2)
(1− α2)2 −
αΣ[4− αΣ]
(2− αΣ)2
}
(A.18)
Straightforward manipulation of the RHS yields(
∆c
2
)2{α2(2− α2)
(1− α2)2 −
αΣ[4− αΣ]
(2− αΣ)2
}
=
1
2
(
∆c
2
)2 α2Σ − 4αΣ + 4α2(2− α2)
(1− α2)2(2− αΣ)2 . (A.19)
Since α2Σ − 4αΣ + 4α2(2 − α2) < 0 if and only if α1 ∈ (α2, 4 − 3α2), the RHS of (A.18) is
strictly negative. Therefore, with the term in square brackets on the LHS of (A.18) being strictly
positive, we must have dαW1 (α2)/dα2 < 0. Taken together, the above observations imply
dαW1 (α2)
dα2
∈ (−1, 0). (A.20)
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Last, note that αW1 (αˆ) = αˆ. To see this, note that for α1 = α2 we have qDH2 = qUH , and in
consequence
∆W = −(1− α2)qDH2
{
1− 1
2
qDH2 − (cH +K)
}
=
− (1− α2)qDH2
{
3
2
qJSH +
1
2
α2
1− α2
∆c
2
}
. (A.21)
With qJSH > 0, for ∆W = 0 we must have qDH2 = 0, which holds for α2 = αˆ. Together with
dαW1 (α2)/dα2 ∈ (−1, 0) this last observation implies αW1 (α2) ∈ (αˆ, αˆ1(α2)). The result then
follows immediately from the final remark of Proposition 3.
(III) ∆W < 0 follows from Proposition 3 (i).
Taken together, the above observations establish the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 5
First, we show that the equilibrium investment levels are indeed characterized by (21) and (22).
Thereafter, we show that comparing (21) and (22) reveals that αD < αU .
Consider price discrimination first. Firm i’s expected profit at the contracting stage does not
depend on firm j’s investment intensity αj such that piD0 (αi;αj) = piD0 (αi). The information
rent left to a low-cost downstream firm is zero if its investment level is too high, i.e., piD0 (αi) = 0
for αi ≥ αˆD. Moreover, dpiD0 (α)/dα|α=0 = qJSH (0)(cH − cL) > 0. Thus, αD ∈ (0, αˆD).
Finally, note that piD0 (·) is a continuously differentiable function and thus αD is characterized
by the first-order condition (21).
Under uniform pricing the profit of a downstream firm i depends also on the rival’s invest-
ment level αj . If αj = 0, then firm i chooses a strictly positive investment level because
∂piU0 (αi; 0)/∂αi|αi=0 > 0. For r = U , implicitly differentiating (19) with respect to αj reveals
dαi
dαj
{
2
∂qˆUH(αΣ)
∂αi
+ αi
∂2qˆUH(αΣ)
∂α2i
− ψ
′′(αi)
(cH − cL)
}
= −∂qˆ
U
H(αΣ)
∂αj
− αi∂
2qˆUH(αΣ)
∂αi∂αj
(A.22)
Under Assumption 1, from (14) it follows that
∂qˆUH(αΣ)
∂αi
=
∂qˆUH(αΣ)
∂αj
=
2(cH − cL)
(2− αΣ)2
[
2P ′(·) + P ′′(·)qˆUH(αΣ)
] < 0 (A.23)
and
∂2qˆUH(αΣ)
∂α2i
=
∂2qˆUH(αΣ)
∂αiαj
=
2(cH − cL)
{
2
[
2P ′(·) + P ′′(·)qˆUH(αΣ)
]− (2− αΣ) [3P ′′(·) + P ′′′(·)qˆUH(αΣ)] ∂qˆUH(αΣ)∂αi
}
(2− αΣ)3
[
2P ′(·) + P ′′(·)qˆUH(αΣ)
]2
≤ 0. (A.24)
This allows us to conclude that firm i’s best-response function is weakly decreasing—weakly
decreasing because it might be the case that firm i chooses αi = 1 for values of αj suffi-
ciently close to zero or αi = 0 for values of αj sufficiently close to one. With downstream
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firms being ex ante symmetric, their best-response functions are symmetric. Existence of a
symmetric Nash equilibrium with equilibrium investment level αU ∈ (0, 1) then follows from
best-response functions being continuous and firm i choosing an investment level strictly less
than 1 for αj sufficiently high. To see the latter point, note the following: (i) if 2αˆ < 1, then
αi = 0 is a best response to αj ∈ [2αˆ, 1] because a higher investment by firm i does not
change the quantity allocation, qUH(αi + αj) = 0, but comes at higher cost; (ii) if 1 < 2αˆ, then
∂piU0 (αi; 1)/∂αi|αi=2αˆ−1 = αi(cH − cL)2/(2− αˆ)2P ′(0)−ψ′(αi) < 0, such that firm i’s best
response is smaller than 2αˆ−1, which itself is smaller than 1 because αˆ < 1 for cH < cL. Last,
note that any symmetric equilibrium under uniform pricing must have αU < αˆ: if αU ≥ 2αˆ,
then firm i’s best response to αj = αU is not αi = αU but αi = 0; if αU ∈ [αˆ, 2αˆ), then firm i
can profitably deviate to αi slightly below 2αˆ − αU , which results in strictly positive expected
profits because qUH(αi + αU ) > 0.
Comparing the equalities (22) and (21) immediately reveals that αD 6= αU . Note that for
αU = αD, we would have qUH = qDH . Suppose, in contradiction, that αU < αD, which implies
that qUH > qDH . Let MR′(q) ≡ 2P ′(q) + qP ′′(q), so that MR(q) denotes the marginal revenue
of a downstream firm. With ψ′(αU ) ≤ ψ′(αD), by hypothesis, it has to hold that
qDH(cH − cL) +
αD
(1− αD)2
(cH − cL)2
MR′(qDH)
≥ qUH(cH − cL) +
αU
2(1− αD)2
(cH − cL)2
MR′(qUH)
,
or equivalently,
(cH − cL)(qUH − qDH) +
αU
2(1− αD)2
(cH − cL)2
MR′(qUH)
− α
D
(1− αD)2
(cH − cL)2
MR′(qDH)
≤ 0. (A.25)
The above inequality is violated because (a) by hypothesis αU < αD and qUH > qDH , and (b) by
Assumption 1 MR′(q) is non-increasing. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6 For φ(α) ≡ 0 and P (q) = max{1 − q, 0}, where the latter implies
MR′(q) = −2, it is straightforward to show that the investment level under price discrimination
is given by
αD = 1−
√
2qJS(cL) (cH − cL)
2qJS(cL)
∈ (0, 1), (A.26)
with qJS(cL) = (1/2)(1 − cL − K). The symmetric investment level under uniform pricing
amounts to
αU = 1− cH − cL +
√
cH − cL
√
cH − cL + 16qJS(cL)
8qJS(cL)
∈ (αD, 1). (A.27)
Given our tie-breaking rule that a downstream firm who is indifferent between several invest-
ment levels always choses the lowest one, there are no asymmetric equilibria and the symmetric
equilibrium is the unique one. In order to see this, let αRi (αj) be the reaction function of firm i.
The slope of the reaction function
dαRi
dαj
= −2 + αi − αj
4− 2αj ∈ (−1,−1/2), (A.28)
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Thus, there is only a symmetric equilibrium because the absolute value of the slope of the
reaction function is always less than one.
The difference in expected welfare between price discrimination and uniform pricing is
∆W =
1
16
(cH − cL)
[
(
√
cH − cL)2 + 3
√
cH − cL
√
cH − cL + 16qJS(cL)
− 10
√
2
√
(cH − cL)qJS(cL)
]
. (A.29)
Thus, ∆W < 0 if and only if
√
cH − cL +
√
9(cH − cL) + 144qJS(cL)−
√
200qJS(cL) < 0, (A.30)
which holds because cH < 1−K.
Proof of Lemma 4:
First, we analyze the manufacturer’s screening problem for the continuous distribution of down-
stream types. Noting that neither the individual rationality constraints nor the incentive com-
patibility constraints depend on the pricing regime, we begin with drawing out the implications
of these constraints for the optimal wholesale tariff. To cut back on notation, we suppress the
subscript i indicating the downstream firm.
Define
V (c) ≡ q(c)[1− q(c)− c]− t(c). (A.31)
Using a revealed preference argument for types c, cˆ ∈ C and cˆ > c we obtain
q(c) ≥ V (c)− V (cˆ)
cˆ− c ≥ q(cˆ). (A.32)
The above chain of inequalities implies that V ′(c) = −q(c) except for points of discontinuity.
Moreover, from (A.32) we immediately obtain that the incentive compatible quantity and trans-
fer schedules, q(c) and t(c), are non-increasing. Using the insights from above, the transfer t(c)
can be stated as
t(c) = q(c)[1− q(c)− c]−
∫ cH
c
q(z) dz (A.33)
because V (c) = V (cH)−
∫ cH
c q(z) dz and V (cH) = 0 in the optimum.
Discriminatory Offers.—With downstream firms operating in separate markets, the manufac-
turer solves two isolated maximization problems. After integrating by parts, the manufacturer’s
problem regarding firm i = 1, 2 can be stated as follows:
Program D1:
max
〈q(c)〉c∈C
∫ cH
cL
(
q(c)[1− q(c)− c−K]− q(c)Fi(c)
fi(c)
)
fi(c) dc
subject to: q(c) is non-increasing
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Ignoring the monotonicity constraint for the moment, point-wise maximization yields
qDi (c) =
1
2
[
1− c−K − Fi(c)
fi(c)
]
. (A.34)
By Assumptions 2 and 3, the quantity schedule qDi (c) is strictly decreasing and assigns a posi-
tive quantity to all types.
Uniform Pricing.—Being restricted to offer the same wholesale tariff to both downstream
firms, the manufacturer maximizes∫ cH
cL
[t(c)−Kq(c)][f1(c) + f2(c)] dc, (A.35)
subject to the (IC) and (IR) constraints. Since the constraints are the same as under price dis-
crimination, the incentive compatible transfer schedule is still characterized by (A.33). Inte-
grating by parts yields∫ cH
cL
∫ cH
c
q(z) dz[f1(c) + f2(c)] dc =
∫ cH
cL
q(c)[F1(c) + F2(c)] dc, (A.36)
such that the manufacturer faces the following problem:
Program U:
max
〈q(c)〉c∈C
∫ cH
cL
(
q(c)[1− q(c)− c−K]− q(c)F1(c) + F2(c)
f1(c) + f2(c)
)
[f1(c) + f2(c)] dc
subject to: q(c) is non-increasing
Ignoring the monotonicity constraint for the moment, point-wise maximization yields
qU (c) =
1
2
[
1− c−K − F1(c) + F2(c)
f1(c) + f2(c)
]
. (A.37)
By Assumptions 2 and 3, the quantity schedule qU (c) is strictly decreasing and assigns a positive
quantity to all types.
Based on the above insights, we now can prove Lemma 4. According to (A.34), if qD1 (c) <
qD2 (c), then F (c)1/f(c)1 > F (c)2/f(c)2. In combination with (A.37), qD1 (c) < qU (c) <
qD2 (c) is equivalent to
F1(c)
f1(c)
>
F1(c) + F2(c)
f1(c) + f2(c)
>
F2(c)
f2(c)
⇐⇒ F1(c)
f1(c)
>
F2(c)
f2(c)
, (A.38)
which establishes the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 7:
Inserting (A.34) and (A.37) into
E[WD] =
2∑
i=1
{∫ cH
cL
[
qDi (c)− (1/2)(qDi (c))2 − (c+K)qDi (c)
]
fi(c) dc
}
(A.39)
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and
E[WU ] =
∫ cH
cL
[
qU (c)− (1/2)(qU (c))2 − (c+K)qU (c)] (f1(c) + f2(c)) dc, (A.40)
respectively, reveals
∆W =
1
8
{∫ cH
cL
f1(c)
[
1− (c+K)− F1(c)
f1(c)
] [
F1(c)f2(c)− F2(c)f1(c)
f1(c)[f1(c) + f2(c)]
]
dc (A.41)
+
∫ cH
cL
f2(c)
[
1− (c+K)− F2(c)
f2(c)
] [
F2(c)f1(c)− F (c)1f2(c)
f2(c)[f1(c) + f2(c)]
]
dc
}
. (A.42)
Simplifying the above expression yields
∆W = −1
8
∫ cH
cL
[F1(c)f2(c)− F2(c)f1(c)]2
f1(c)f2(c)[f1(c) + f2(c)]
dc < 0, (A.43)
which establishes the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 9:
The manufacturer maximizes
Π = αr[tL − kqL] + δr[tH − kqH ] (A.44)
subject to (IRAH ), (ICH ), (IRLH ), and (ICL). If discriminatory offers are allowed, then δD =
1 − αi with regard to downstream firm i ∈ {1, 2}. Under uniform wholesale tariffs, we have
δU = 2− αΣ.
First, consider the relaxed optimization problem where, under pricing regime r ∈ {D,U},
M maximizes (A.44) subject only to (IRAH ) and (ICL). For a given allocation (qL, qH), the
optimal transfers make both constrains bind:
trH = pi(qH , cH)− piAH ,
trL = pi(qL, cL)− pi(qH , cL) + pi(qH , cH)− piAH .
Except for being shifted downward by the amount piAH , the transfers are the same as in the
standard case without alternative supply. In consequence, the optimal allocation is the same
as in Section 4: qrL(αr) = qJS(cL), and qrH(αr) = qˆr(αr) for αr ≤ αˆr, where αˆD = αˆ
and αˆU = 2αˆ, and zero otherwise. With the allocation satisfying the monotonicity constraint
(MON), (ICH ) is satisfied trivially because (ICL) holds with equality. Thus, this allocation and
the associated transfers solve M ’s original problem as long as the (IRAL) constraint is satisfied,
or, equivalently, as long as
pi(qJS(cL), cL)− trL ≥ piAL ⇐⇒ φ ≤ qrH(αr). (A.45)
Recall that qˆr(αr) is a strictly decreasing function with qˆr(0) = qJS(cH) and qˆr(αˆr) = 0. In
consequence, (IRAL) holds if φ ≤ qJS(cH) and αr ≤ αr(φ) ∈ [0, αˆr], where αr(φ) is implicitly
defined as
qrH(α
r(φ)) ≡ φ. (A.46)
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Existence and uniqueness of αr(φ) follow from the intermediate value theorem together with
qˆr(αr) being a continuous and strictly decreasing function on [0, αˆr].
Next, consider the relaxed problem where M maximizes (A.44) subject only to (IRAH ) and
(IRAL). For a given allocation (qL, qH), the optimal transfers make both constrains bind:
trL = pi(qL, cL)− piAL (A.47)
trH = pi(qH , cH)− piAH (A.48)
Inserting these transfers into (A.44) reveals that M ’s goal is to maximize the joint surplus.
Hence, the quantities implemented are qrL(αr) = qJS(cL) and qrH(αr) = qJS(cH). Obviously,
the above wholesale mechanism satisfies the monotonicity constraint (MON). For this solution
to the relaxed problem also to be a solution to the original problem, it needs to be checked
that the mechanism is also incentive compatible. The incentive constraint of the low-cost firm,
(ICL), is satisfied if
pi(qJS(cL), cL)− tL ≥ pi(qJS(cH), cL)− tH ⇐⇒ qJS(cH) ≤ φ. (A.49)
A high-cost firm truthfully reveals its type, i.e. (ICH ) is satisfied, if
pi(qJS(cH), cH)− tH ≥ pi(qJS(cL), cH)− tL ⇐⇒ qJS(cL) ≥ φ. (A.50)
Thus, for φ ∈ [qJS(cH), qJS(cL)] the above wholesale mechanism is optimal under the original
problem.
Last, consider the relaxed problem where M maximizes (A.44) subject to (IRAH ), (IRAL), and
(ICL). For φ ≤ qJS(cH) and αr ≤ αr(φ), on the one hand, and for φ ∈ [qJS(cH), qJS(cL)],
on the other hand, the solution to this problem is given by the solution to the respective less
heavily constrained optimization problem considered before, where only two of the constraints
were binding in the optimum. For φ < qJS(cH) and αr > αr(φ), however, in the optimum
all three constraints must be binding. Thus, transfers under pricing regime r ∈ {D,U} as
functions of the implemented allocation (qL, qH) are given by:
trH = pi(qH , cH)− piAH (A.51)
trL = pi(qL, cL)− piAL (A.52)
trL − trH = pi(qL, cL)− pi(qH , cL). (A.53)
Solving the above equations (A.51)–(A.53) for qH yields
qrH(α
r) =
piAL − piAH
cH − cL = φ. (A.54)
With qH being fixed by (A.54), M chooses qL in order to maximize
trL − kqL = pi(qL, cL)− piAL − kqL , (A.55)
which is achieved by qrL(αr) = qJS(cL). The above allocation clearly satisfies the monotonicity
constraint (MON), and (ICH ) trivially holds because (ICL) is satisfied with equality. Thus, the
above wholesale mechanism also is a solution to the original problem for φ < qJS(cH) and
αr > αr(φ). This establishes the desired result.
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Proof of Proposition 10:
(i) For α2 < αD(φ) ≤ αU1 (α2;φ) ≤ α1, we have qDH1 = qUH = φ < qDH2 = qˆD(α2). According
to (16), the difference in expected welfare amounts to
∆W = (1− α2)
{∫ qˆD(α2)
φ
P (z)dz − (cH +K)
[
qˆD(α2)− φ
]} (A.56)
Thus, ∆W > 0 if and only if
∫ qˆD(α2)
0
P (z)dz − (cH +K)qˆD(α2) >
∫ φ
0
P (z)dz − (cH +K)φ. (A.57)
To see that this inequality indeed is satisfied, note that the function
∫ q
0 P (z)dz − (cH + K)q
attains its maximum at q∗ which is implicitely characterized by P (q∗) = cH +K. Comparing
this last expression with the first-order condition characterizing qˆD(α2) in (10) immediately
implies qˆD(α2) < q∗. Since the function
∫ q
0 P (z)dz − (cH + K)q is strictly concave in q
whenever P > 0, the result follows from φ < qˆD(α2).
(ii) If α2 < αD(φ) < α1 < αU1 (α2;φ), then qDH1 = φ < qUH = qˆU (αΣ) < qDH2 = qˆD(α2).
The difference in expected welfare then is
∆W = (1− α1)
{∫ φ
qˆU (αΣ)
P (z)dz − (cH +K)
[
φ− qˆU (αΣ)
]}
+ (1− α2)
{∫ qˆD(α2)
qˆU (αΣ)
P (z)dz − (cH +K)
[
qˆD(α2)− qˆU (αΣ)
]}
. (A.58)
Differentiation with respect to α1 yields
d∆W
dα1
= −
{∫ φ
qˆU (αΣ)
P (z)dz − (cH +K)
[
φ− qˆU (αΣ)
]}
− (2− (α1 + α2)) qˆ
U (αΣ)
dα1
[
P (qˆU (αΣ))− (cH +K)
]
. (A.59)
Note that φ < qˆU (αΣ) < q∗, where q∗ was defined in the proof of part (i) and the sec-
ond inequality follows from (14). The same reasoning as in the proof of part (i) implies
−
{∫ φ
qˆU (αΣ)
P (z)dz − (cH +K)
[
φ− qˆU (αΣ)
]}
> 0. By (14) P (qˆU (αΣ)) − (cH + K) =
P ′(qˆU (αΣ))qˆ
U (αΣ)+
αΣ
2−αΣ
(cH−cL) > 0, and the desired result follows from dqˆU (αΣ)/dα1 <
0.
(iii) Follows immediately from the proof of Proposition 4.
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B. SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
Supplementary Material for Section 7
Proof of Lemma 5:
In what follows, we continue to make use of the following: qJSi = qJS(ci) = (1− ci −K)/2;.
Note, however, that qJSi does not refer to the joint-surplus maximizing quantity in the context
of downstream competition.
With transfers charged to firm i being pinned down by (IRiH ) and (ICiL), M chooses quan-
tities in order to solve
max
q1L,q1H ,q2L,q2H
ΠD = α1 {q1L [1− q1L − γE2[q]− cL]− q1L(cH − cL)−Kq1L}
(1− α1) {q1H [1− q1H − γE2[q]− cH ]−Kq1H}
α2 {q2L [1− q2L − γE1[q]− cL]− q2L(cH − cL)−Kq2L}
(1− α2) {q2H [1− q2H − γE1[q]− cH ]−Kq2H}
(B.1)
The necessary F.O.C.s read:
∂ΠD
∂qiL
= 0 ⇒ qiL = qJS(cL)− γEj [q], (B.2)
and
∂ΠD
∂qiH
= 0 ⇒ qiH = qJS(cH)− γEj [q]− αi
1− αi
cH − cL
2
, (B.3)
where i 6= j. With E[qi] = αiqiL + (1− αi)qiH , combining (B.2) and (B.3) yields
Ei[q] = Ej [q] =
qJS
1 + γ
. (B.4)
Plugging (B.4) back into (B.2) and (B.3) allows us to solve for
qDiL(γ) = q
JS
L −
γ
1 + γ
qJSH and qDiH(γ) =
1
1 + γ
qJSH −
αi
1− αi
cH − cL
2
. (B.5)
In order to show that the above F.O.C.s are not only necessary but also sufficient, consider the
associated Hessian mtrix of second-order derivatives:
H
D =


∂2ΠD
∂q21L
∂2ΠD
∂q1L∂q1H
∂2ΠD
∂q1L∂q2L
∂2ΠD
∂q1L∂q2H
∂2ΠD
∂q1H∂q1L
∂2ΠD
∂q21H
∂2ΠD
∂q1H∂q2L
∂2ΠD
∂q1H∂q2H
∂2ΠD
∂q2L∂q1L
∂2ΠD
∂q2L∂q1H
∂2ΠD
∂q22L
∂2ΠD
∂q2L∂q2H
∂2ΠD
∂q2H∂q1L
∂2ΠD
∂q2H∂q1H
∂2ΠD
∂q2H∂q2L
∂2ΠD
∂q22H


=


−2α1 0 −2γα1α2 −2γα1(1− α2)
0 −2(1− α1) −2γ(1− α1)α2 −2γ(1− α1)(1− α2)
−2γα1α2 −2γ(1− α1)α2 −2α2 0
−2γα1(1− α2) −2γ(1− α1)(1− α2) 0 −2(1− α2)


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Letting Dk denote the kth leading principal minor, we have
(−1)1D1 = 2α1 > 0 (B.6)
(−1)2D2 = 4α1(1− α1) > 0 (B.7)
(−1)3D3 = 8α1α2(1− α1)(1− γ2α2) > 0 (B.8)
(−1)4D4 = 16α1α2(1− α1)(1− α2)(1− γ2) > 0 (B.9)
such that the objective function is strictly concave and the F.O.C.s are indeed sufficient for
optimality.
From (B.5) it follows immediately that the monotonicity requirement imposed by incentive
compatibility is satisfied:
qDiL(γ) > q
D
iH(γ) ⇐⇒ qJSL > qJSH −
αi
1− αi . (B.10)
Next, we show that M wants to serve both firms for γ sufficiently low:
qDiH(γ) > 0 ⇐⇒ γ <
(1− cH −K)− αi(1− cL −K)
cH − cL =: γ
D
>0, (B.11)
where (1− cH −K)− αi(1− cL −K) > 0 since αi < αˆD.
Last, it remains to argue that free disposal has no bite for γ sufficiently low. Given quantity
qj , firm i′s best response is given by
qi(qj |ci) = argmax
q
q(1− q − γqj − ci) = 1− ci
2
− γ
2
qj . (B.12)
With firm i’s best response being decreasing in firm j’s quantity, for free disposal not to impose
a binding restriction we must have qDiH(γ) ≤ qi(qDjL(γ)|ci) and qDiL(γ) ≤ qi(qDjL(γ)|ci). First,
note that qDiH(γ) ≤ qi(qDjL(γ)|cH) if and only if
γ2(cH − cL) + γ
[
qJS(cL)− αi
1− αi (cH − cL)− (1− cH)
]
−
[
K +
αi
1− αi (cH − cL)
]
≤ 0. (B.13)
The quadratic function on the LHS of (B.13) has two zeros, one of which is strictly posi-
tive, whereas the other one is strictly negative. In consequence, (B.13) is satisfied for all
γ ∈ [0, γDFH ], where
γDFH :=
(1− cH)− qJS(cL) + αi1−αi (cH − cL)
2(cH − cL)
+
√√√√[(1− cH)− qJS(cL) + αi1−αi (cH − cL)
2(cH − cL)
]2
+
[
K +
αi
1− αi (cH − cL)
]
. (B.14)
Likewise, qDiL(γ) ≤ qi(qDjL(γ)|cL) if and only if
γ2(cH − cL) + γ
[
qJS(cL) + 2(cH − cL)− (1− cL)
]−K ≤ 0. (B.15)
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The quadratic function on the LHS of (B.15) has two zeros, one of which is strictly positive,
whereas the other one is strictly negative. In consequence, (B.15) is satisfied for all γ ∈ [0, γDFL],
where
γDFL :=
1− cL − qJS(cL)− 2(cH − cL)
2(cH − cL)
+
√[
1− cL − qJS(cL)− 2(cH − cL)
2(cH − cL)
]2
+
K
cH − cL . (B.16)
Defining γD := min{γD>0, γDFH , γDFL} establishes the desired result.
Proof of Lemma 6:
In what follows, we continue to make use of the following: qJSi = qJS(ci) = (1− ci −K)/2;.
Note, however, that qJSi does not refer to the joint-surplus maximizing quantity in the context
of downstream competition.
As we argued in the text, if (IR2H ) and (IC2L) are both satisfied with equality, then—with ex-
ception of (IC1H )—all remaining incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints
are automatically satisfied. For the moment, we therefore ignore (IC1H ) and show that this
constraint is satisfied as well under the optimal contract for γ sufficiently small.
With transfers being determined by (IR2H ) and (IC2L), M chooses quantities in order to
solve
max
qL,qH
ΠU = αΣ {qL [1− qL − γE1[q]− cL]− qL(cH − cL)−KqL}
+ (2− αΣ) {qH [1− qH − γE1[q]− cH ]−KqH}
(B.17)
The necessary F.O.C.s read:
∂ΠU
∂qL
= 0 ⇒ qL = qJS(cL) 1
1 + γα1
− γαΣ(1− α1) + (2− αΣ)α1
2αΣ(1 + γα1)
qH , (B.18)
and
∂ΠU
∂qH
= 0 ⇒ qiH = qJS(cH) 1
1 + γ(1− α1)
− αΣ
2− αΣ
cH − cL
2
1
1 + γ(1− α1)
− γ αΣ(1− α1) + (2− αΣ)α1
2(2− αΣ)(1 + γ(1− α1))qL. (B.19)
Rearranging these F.O.C.s yields
qUL (γ) = q
JS(cL)
4αΣ(2− αΣ)(1 + γ(1− α1))
Λ(γ)
− γ [αΣ(1− α1) + (2− αΣ)α1][(2− αΣ)(1− cH −K)− αΣ(cH − cL)]
Λ(γ)
(B.20)
and
qUH(γ) = q
JS(cH)
4αΣ(2− αΣ)(1 + γα1)
Λ(γ)
− (cH − cL)2(αΣ)
2(1 + γα1)
Λ(γ)
− γ [αΣ(1− α1) + (2− αΣ)α1]αΣ(1− cL −K)
Λ(γ)
, (B.21)
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where
Λ(γ) = 4αΣ(2− αΣ)(1 + γ)− γ2(αΣ − 2α1)2. (B.22)
In order to guarantee that M ’s problem is well behaved, consider the Hessian matrix
H
U =

 ∂2ΠU∂q2L ∂2ΠU∂qL∂qH
∂2ΠU
∂qH∂qL
∂2ΠU
∂q2
H


=
(
−2αΣ(1 + γα1) −γ[αΣ(1− α1) + (2− αΣ)α1]
−γ[αΣ(1− α1) + (2− αΣ)α1] −2(2− αΣ)(1 + γ(1− α1))
)
It is readily verified that |HU | > 0 if and only if Λ(γ) > 0. In consequence, M ’s objective
function is strictly concave for γ ∈ [0, γUc ), where
γUc :=
2αΣ(2− αΣ)
(αΣ − 2α1)2 +
√(
2αΣ(2− αΣ)
(αΣ − 2α1)2
)2
+
4αΣ(2− αΣ)
(αΣ − 2α1)2 . (B.23)
Focusing on the case where Λ(γ) > 0, we next show that 0 < qUH < qUL is satisfied for γ
sufficiently small. First, we have qUH > 0 if and only if
γΩ < 2αΣ[2(1− cH −K)− αΣ(1− cL −K)], (B.24)
where
Ω := [αΣ(1− α1) + (2− αΣ)α1]αΣ(1− cL −K)
− (1− cH −K)2αΣα1(2− αΣ) + 2(αΣ)2α1(cH − cL). (B.25)
Since the RHS of (B.24) is strictly positive for α1 < αˆD, (B.24) is satisfied for γ ∈ [0, γU0<H),
where γU0<H is defined as follows: γU0<H = 1 if Ω ≤ 0 and
γU0<H :=
2αΣ[2(1− cH −K)− αΣ(1− cL −K)]
Ω
(B.26)
if Ω > 0.
Likewise, qUH < qUL if and only if
γΩˆ > −4αΣ(cH − cL), (B.27)
where
Ωˆ := 4αΣ(1− cH −K)− [2− αΣ + 2(αΣ − 2α1)](1− cH −K) (B.28)
Thus, (B.26) is satisfied for γ ∈ [0, γUH<L), where γUH<L is defined as follows: γUH<L = 1 if
Ωˆ ≥ 0 and
γUH<L :=
4αΣ(cH − cL)
|4αΣ(1− cH −K)− [2− αΣ + 2(αΣ − 2α1)](1− cH −K)| . (B.29)
if Ωˆ < 0.
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We still to check that free disposal does not impose a binding restriction. First, note that
qUH(γ) ≤ qi(qUL (γ)|cH) if and only if
γ2AFH + γBFH + CFH ≤ 0, (B.30)
where
AFH = (1− cL −K)2αΣ(2− αΣ)(1− α1) + (αΣ − 2α1)2(1− cH)
− [αΣ(1− α1) + (2− αΣ)α1]{(2− αΣ)(1− cH −K)− αΣ(cH − cL)}, (B.31)
BFH = 4(1− cH −K)αΣ(2− αΣ)α1 − 4(αΣ)2(cH − cL)α1
− 2[αΣ(1− α1) + (2− αΣ)α1]αΣ(1− cL − k)
+ (1− cL − k)2αΣ(2− αΣ)− (1− cH)4αΣ(2− αΣ), (B.32)
CFH = −4αΣ[K(2− αΣ) + αΣ(cH − cL)] < 0. (B.33)
Defining
γUFH =


− BFH2AFH +
√(
BFH
2AFH
)2
− CFHAFH if AFH > 0
− BFH2AFH −
√(
BFH
2AFH
)2
− CFHAFH if AFH < 0, BFH > 0 and
(
BFH
2AFH
)2
≥ CFHAFH
−CFHBFH if AFH = 0, BFH > 0
1 otherwise
(B.34)
(B.30) is satisfied at for γ ∈ [0, γUFH). Likewise, qUL (γ) ≤ qi(qUL (γ)|cL) if and only if
γ2AFL + γBFL + CFL ≤ 0, (B.35)
where
AFL = (1− cL)(αΣ − 2α1)2 + (1− cL −K)2αΣ(2− αΣ)(1− α1)
− [αΣ(1− α1) + (2− αΣ)α1]{(2− αΣ)(1− cH −K)− αΣ(cH − cL)}, (B.36)
BFL = (1− cL −K)2αΣ(2− αΣ) + 4(1− cL −K)αΣ(2− αΣ)(1− α1)
− 2[αΣ(1− α1) + (2− αΣ)α1]{(2− αΣ)(1− cH −K)− αΣ(cH−L)}
− (1− cL)4αΣ(2− αΣ), (B.37)
CFL = −4αΣ(2− αΣ)K < 0. (B.38)
Defining
γUFL =


− BFL2AFL +
√(
BFL
2AFL
)2
− CFLAFL if AFL > 0
− BFL2AFL −
√(
BFL
2AFL
)2
− CFLAFL if AFL < 0, BFL > 0 and
(
BFL
2AFL
)2
≥ CFLAFL
−CFLBFL if AFL = 0, BFL > 0
1 otherwise
(B.39)
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(B.35) is satisfied at for γ ∈ [0, γUFL).
It remains to show that (IC1H ) is satisfied for γ sufficiently small if transfers are chosen such
that (IC2L) just binds, i.e.,
qUL
[
1− qUL − E1[qU ]− cL
]− qUH [1− qUH − E1[qU ]− cL] = tL − tH
≥ qUL
[
1− qUL − E1[qU ]− cH
]− qH [1− qUH − E1[qU ]− cH] . (B.40)
Using the fact that the monotonicity requirement is satisfied for γ sufficiently small, qUL ≥ qUH ,
and that α1 − α2 = 2α1 − αΣ, the above condition can be rewritten as
γ(2α1 − αΣ)(qUL − qUH) ≤ (cH − cL) (B.41)
Substituting (B.20) and (B.21) into (B.41) and (straightforward but nevertheless very tedious)
rearranging results in the following equivalent condition:
γ2Ω˜ ≤ (cH − cL)4αΣ(2− αΣ) + γ(cH − cL)4αΣ2(1− α1), (B.42)
where
Ω˜ := (2α1−αΣ)
{
(1−cL−K)αΣ4−2(αΣ+2α1)(1−cH−K)+(cH−cL)(2α1−αΣ)
}
.
(B.43)
Note that the RHS of (B.42) is strictly positive. Thus, (IC1H ) is satisfied if (IC2L) binds for
γ ∈ [0, γIC1H), where γIC1H is defined as follows: γIC1H = 1 if Ω˜ ≤ 0, and
γIC1H =
(cH − cL)4αΣ2(1− α1)
2Ω˜
+
√(
(cH − cL)4αΣ2(1− α1)
2Ω˜
)2
+
(cH − cL)4αΣ(2− αΣ)
Ω˜
. (B.44)
if Ω˜ > 0.
Defining γU := min{γUc , γU0<H , γUH<L, γUFH , γUFL, γUIC1H} establishes the desired result.
Supplementary Material for Section 8
To complement the analysis in Section 8, we now give a detailed account for under what cir-
cumstances the upstream firm prefers to serve only one type of downstream firm. Unless stated
otherwise, the following observations apply to both pricing regimes.
Clearly, when serving only one type of downstream firm with cost c, the highest possible
profit M could hope for would be achieved by offering the joint-surplus-maximizing quantity
qJS(c) and charging a transfer that just ensures participation by that type, t = pi(qJS(c), c) −
piA(c). This observation has two immediate implication. First, for φ ∈ [qJS(cH), qJS(cL)] it
never pays off for M to serve only one type of downstream firm because, according to Propo-
sition 9 (iii), under the optimal contract that serves both cost types each type is offered the re-
spective joint-surplus-maximizing quantity and—with both participation constraints binding—
M extracts all the surplus. A second implication is that even for φ < qJS(cH) it can never
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be optimal for M to exclude the low-cost type because this type does not reject the bundle
(qJS(cH), pi(q
JS(cH), cH) − piAH), which makes the high-cost type just break even. Thus, for
φ < qJS(cH) the upstream supplier will always benefit from serving both types of downstream
firms instead of designing a contract that excludes the low-cost type.
The remaining question is whether M might benefit from excluding the high-cost type when
φ ≤ qJS(cH). Given Assumption 5, a high-cost firm always rejects the bundle (qJS(cL),
pi(qJS(cL), cL)−piAL ). Hence, M ’s profits under pricing regime r ∈ {D,U} from serving only
type L are given by
ΠrL = α
r
[
pi(qJS(cL), cL)− piAL −KqJS(cL)
]
. (B.45)
If, on the other hand, M serves both types of downstream firms, we know that both (ICL) and
(IRH ) are binding under both pricing regimes for φ ≤ qJS(cH). With transfers being pinned
down by these constraints, the quantities offered correspond to qrL(αr) = qJS(cL) and qrH(αr)
as identified in Proposition 9. Thus, M ’s profits from serving both types of downstream firms
under pricing regime r is
ΠrLH = α
r
{
pi(qJS(cL), cL)− (cH − cL)qrH(αr)− piAH −KqJS(cL)
}
+ δr
{
pi(qrH(α
r), cH)− piAH −KqrH(αr)
}
. (B.46)
Comparison of (B.45) and (B.46) reveals that M prefers to serve only the low-cost type under
pricing regime r ∈ {D,U} if
αr(cH − cL)(qrH(αr)− φ) > δr
[
pi(qrH(α
r), cH)− piAH −KqrH(αr)
]
. (B.47)
Since pi(qH , cH)−KqH is strictly increasing in qH on [0, qJS(cH)), under Assumption 4 there
exists a unique quantity between 0 and qJS(cH) at which the right-hand side (RHS) of (B.47)
equals zero. Let this quantity-threshold be denoted by φ˜. Formally, φ˜ is implicitly defined by
pi(φ˜, cH)− piAH −Kφ˜ ≡ 0. (B.48)
As we prove below, for φ ∈ [φ˜, qJS(cH)] it never pays off for M to exclude the high-cost
downstream firm. With φ being relatively large, a low-cost downstream firm benefits by far
more from procuring the input from the fringe than a high-cost downstream firm. Thus, the
rents the manufacturer can extract when contracting with a low-cost type are relatively low. This
in turn implies that cutting back on information rents paid to a low-cost type is less important
but contracting with a high-cost type is not that unimportant. Hence, it is optimal always to
contract with a high-cost downstream firm. For φ ∈ [0, φ˜), on the other hand, we are closer
to the standard case without a fringe supply. While M serves both types of downstream firms
when the probability of facing a high-cost type is high, once αr exceeds a certain threshold, M
considers it profitable to serve only the low-cost type. To characterize this threshold formally,
fix some φ ∈ [0, φ˜) and consider values of αr ∈ (0, α˜r], where α˜r is implicitly defined by
qˆr(α˜r) = φ˜. Application of the envelope theorem yields
d(ΠrL −ΠrLH)
dαr
= (cH−cL)(qrH(αr)−φ)+
[
pi(qrH(α
r), cH)− piAH −KqrH(αr)
]
> 0, (B.49)
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where the inequality follows from the definition of φ˜ in (B.48) and qˆr(αr) ≥ φ˜ for αr ∈ (0, α˜r].
Since ΠL − ΠrLH |αr=0 < 0 and ΠL − ΠrLH |αr=α˜r > 0, by the intermediate value theorem we
know that for any φ ∈ [0, φ˜) there exists a unique value α˜r(φ) ∈ (0, α˜r) such that
ΠrL −ΠrLH |αr=αr(φ) ≡ 0, (B.50)
which yields the desired characterization of the threshold.
1 αi
φ
qˆ(αi)
α˜
φ˜
α˜D(φ)
αˆ
qJS(cH)
qJS(cL)
Figure 4: M ’s decision which types to serve
We summarize these observations in the following lemma, which is illustrated for a discrim-
inatory pricing regime in Figure 4. In the light-gray shaded area both types of downstream
firms are served, whereas in the dark-gray shaded area the high-cost type is excluded.29 In
consequence, all the statements in the main text refer to the light-gray shaded area.
Lemma 7 Suppose Assumptions 4 and 5 hold. Under either pricing regime, the low-cost type
is never excluded. Under pricing regime r ∈ {D,U}, the upstream supplier does not exclude
the high-cost type if (i) φ ∈ [φ˜, qJS(cH)], or (ii) φ ∈ [0, φ˜) and αr ≤ α˜r(φ).
Proof:
We first prove Part (i). First, consider the case φ ∈ [φ˜, qJS(cH)]. Under pricing regime r ∈
{D,U}, according to Proposition 9 (ii), for αr ≥ αr(φ) the optimal quantity to offer when
serving the high-cost type is qrH(αr) = φ. In consequence, the left-hand side (LHS) of (B.47)
29As becomes obvious from (B.47), the threshold α˜r(φ) depends on both piAL and piAH . In order to depict the locus
of this threshold in the (αr, φ)-space, in Figure 4 it is implicitly assumed that variations in φ are due to changes
of either piAL or piAH .
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equals zero, whereas the RHS is (at least weakly) positive, i.e., M does not exclude the high-
cost type. If αr < αr(φ), then—according to Proposition 9 (i)—the optimal quantity to offer
when serving a high-cost downstream firm is qrH(αr) = qˆr(αr) ≥ φ. To see that M prefers
to serve both types of downstream firms in this case as well, suppose that—while leaving the
quantity to a low-cost firm unchanged—M could offer qH = φ to a high-cost downstream firm
(instead of qˆr(αr)) together with tariffs chosen such that (IRAH ) and (ICL) bind. Since qH = φ,
(IRAL) is satisfied with equality. With this contractual menu, the LHS of (B.47) obviously equals
zero, whereas the RHS is (at least weakly) positive since φ ≥ φ˜, i.e., M prefers serving both
types of downstream firms with this alternative allocation over serving only the low-cost type.
Clearly, M ’s profits under the optimal contractual menu for serving both typs of downstream
firms as identified in Proposition 9 (i) cannot be lower than profits under this altered allocation.
In summary, under pricing regime r ∈ {D,U}, for φ ∈ [φ˜, qJS(cH)] we have ΠrL ≥ ΠrLH
irrespective of αr, i.e., M will always serve both types of downstream firms.
Regarding part (ii) it remains to show that M prefers to serve only the low-cost type for
φ < φ˜ and αr > α˜r. If αr ∈ (α˜r, αr(φ)), then φ < qˆr(αr) < φ˜, which implies that the LHS of
(B.47) is strictly positive whereas the RHS of (B.47) is strictly negative, i.e., M prefers to serve
only the low-cost type of downstream firm. If αr ≥ αr(φ), then qrH(αr) = φ. Since φ < φ˜,
the left-hand side (LHS) of (B.47) equals zero, whereas the RHS is strictly negative. Thus, M
prefers to exclude the high-cost type in this case as well, which establishes the desired result.
Note that the upstream firm’s motive for not serving the high-cost type changes as αr in-
creases: For αr only slightly above the threshold αr(φ) the (IRAL) constraint is slack under the
optimal contract when serving both firms, so M ’s incentive for excluding the high-cost type is
rooted in the desire to cut back on the information rent paid to the low-cost type. For relatively
high values of αr, on the other hand, (IRAL) is binding under the optimal contract when serving
both firms; here, exclusion of the high-cost type is rooted in M ’s desire to avoid making losses
from serving this type.
